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Summary 
This report has the following objectives: (a) to examine the defining factors that charac-
terized Turkey’s path of secularization and the process of Islamization that has been evi-
dent in state and society especially since the 1980s; (b) to analyze the phenomenon of the 
“politicization of Islam”; and (c) to examine the dynamic processes of transformation in 
the Turkish Islamist movement from the policies and activities of the Welfare Party (RP) 
to that of the current Justice and Development Party (AKP). 
State, politics, and society in Turkey are largely secularized and have accepted the sub-
ordination of Islam to politics. The process of secularization that was launched by the 
Ottoman leadership in the first half of the 19th century took place under Islamic auspices 
and was an endogenous – and not an exogenous – one, which was a key factor in making 
the reforms acceptable to the Turkish population. These reforms made it easier for Tur-
key’s founder Atatürk to transform the Ottoman monarchy into a nation-state modeled 
on the European example. 
The Turkish Republic, however, transformed the multi-religious and multi-ethnic 
state solely along the lines of Turkish nationalism and Sunni Islam, which became the two 
sources of legitimacy for the Kemalist state. The hegemony of a Turkish ethnic identity in 
conjunction with religious homogeneity was designed to strengthen territorial integrity 
and the formation of a national identity – a dogma that is still applied today. At the same 
time, this political-religious ideology feeds the fear that remains greatest among Kemalists 
to this day, namely the social and territorial fragmentation of Turkey along the dividing 
lines of laicists vs. Islamists (the constitutional dimension), Turkish vs. Kurdish national-
ists (the ethnic dimension), and Sunnis vs. Alevis (the religious dimension). 
The Kemalist understanding of laicism is both authoritarian and undemocratic. The 
Turkish state’s model of laicism is aimed at co-opting Sunni Islam, the religion of more 
than three quarters of the Turkish population. Turkey has pledged itself to finance and 
administer this faith exclusively – which means that Sunni Islam has de facto been nation-
alized. In doing so, the state has abandoned not only its obligation of religious neutrality 
but also created for itself a monopoly of interpretation of and control over this faith. The 
result has been a politicization of Islam “from above”, i.e., by the state, with the goal of 
secularizing the entire Turkish society, homogenizing the different religious communities 
(especially in an effort to “Sunnify” Alevi Islam), and marginalizing Kurdish identity, thus 
securing the country’s territorial unity against Kurdish nationalists. To this end, the state 
propagates a republican, laicist, and ethno-nationalist (i.e., “Turkifying”) state Islam.  
Democracies need not be neutral in their philosophy, i.e., a strict institutional separa-
tion of state and religion is not a prerequisite for a functioning democracy. A democratic 
constitutional state committed to human rights, however, must make sure not to dis-
criminate against any religion or attempt to assimilate particular ethnic groups, as is the 
case in Turkey. To address these deficiencies, the European Union, as the largest sup-
porter of democracy in Turkey, must use the political leverage of accession talks to de-
mand an end to the discrimination of the non-Sunni and Kurdish parts of the population.  
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The Kemalist model of laicism unintentionally facilitates a politicization of Islam 
“from below”, i.e., by political parties and social groups. Their aim is less to transform 
Turkey back into an Islamic state than to weaken the Kemalist monopoly on the inter-
pretation of religion, to exploit anti-Western resentments, to win electoral votes from the 
Kurdish population, and to end the restrictions on religious freedom. 
The politicization of Islam “from below” began with Turkey’s transition to a 
democratic multi-party system. The election victory of the conservative religious 
Democratic Party (DP, Demokrat Partisi) of Adnan Menderes in 1950 represented an 
important turning point in Turkish history as political power was no longer viewed as an 
administrative tool for pushing through an elitist state-building project (Kemalism), but 
was seen instead as a participatory instrument for asserting its own (religious) interests. 
Prime Minister Menderes can be credited with having prevented the splintering-off or 
radicalization of religious groups and with expanding the state’s social legitimacy through 
his liberal stance vis-à-vis Islam. By integrating such groups, the Democratic Party was 
able to ensure that they did not become an “underground movement” but instead became 
part of the parliamentary system. 
In the 1970s, the first Islamist parties in Turkey emerged from a democratic, parlia-
mentary environment under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan. They not only repre-
sented the rights of people with religious interests in a pluralist process of political ex-
pression, but also marked out the terms under which parties with Islamist goals could 
operate and the terms under which they could participate in government.  
The 1980 military coup triggered, under the auspices of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis 
(TIS), a turning point in Turkish politics: the expansion of state-run religious services, the 
introduction of religious education as a compulsory subject in public schools, and the use 
of the Diyanet, the state agency for religious affairs, for the “promotion of national soli-
darity and integration”. These changes not only led to a nationalization of Islam, but also 
to an Islamization of the nation. The military granted Sunni Islam a discrete and impor-
tant role in the country’s sociopolitical development; it was the “new” old source of 
legitimization for the Kemalist state. 
Under the aegis of Prime Minister Turgut Özal an official revaluation of Islam as part 
of Turkish identity took place. The state was no longer regarded as a mere collection of 
institutions and agencies, but as the champion of a collective identity. Özal’s liberal eco-
nomic and social policies promoted religious interest groups; the development of an 
Islamic business world and of the religious but pro-democratic “Anatolian bourgeoisie” is 
one of Özal’s main achievements. 
The rise of the Islamist Welfare Party (RP) is primarily owed to endogenous factors 
and would have been inconceivable without the ideological change at the highest level of 
the state under the influence of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. The party operated – due 
to pressure from its coalition partner – within Turkey’s democratic and republican pa-
rameters. The RP’s era, however, did witness an Islamization of the public sphere and a 
politicization of religion. The “Process of February 28” led to a split in Necmettin 
Erbakan’s movement and triggered ideological change in Turkish Islamism that has deep-
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ened its dynamic integration into parliamentary democracy. The reform-oriented wing of 
the Islamist movement succeeded in freeing itself from the ideology of the Welfare Party 
and in ushering in a post-Islamist phase. This wing became institutionalized in the con-
servative religious AKP. The AKP can be classified as a hybrid political group that repre-
sents a unique synthesis of reformism and conservatism that crosses class boundaries. Its 
spectacular victory in the 2002 parliamentary elections was not just a result of this ideo-
logical change but must also be regarded – just as in the case of the RP’s prior success – in 
the light of socioeconomic problems. 
After the ban of the Welfare Party, the military’s toleration of the AKP victory repre-
sented an important milestone in Turkey’s process of democratization. The AKP’s im-
pressive politics of reform paved the way to EU accession negotiations and furthered the 
democratization of Turkey. The intellectual evolution in the conservative religious camp 
since the end of the 1990s is exemplified in this turn toward the European Union, and the 
corresponding turn away from the strong nation-state and the Islamic world. 
Despite its occasionally Islamist rhetoric, the AKP does not pose a threat to Turkish 
democracy. Above all, criticism of AKP policies by the Kemalist state elite reflects the fear 
that their own prerogative over the state’s resources will be called into question. This fear 
is exacerbated by the fact that the conservative religious AKP wants to curtail the Turkish 
military’s ability to act autonomously and as superordinate to the institutions of govern-
ment in favor of the primacy of popular sovereignty. 
My analyses in this paper lead to the conclusion that overall, the AKP’s policies are ori-
ented toward the fundamental principles of democracy and the rule of law. This signifies 
an important milestone – not only for the democratization of the Islamist movement, but 
also for that of Turkey. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Object of Investigation 
“The purpose of laicism is to protect religion.”  
Süleyman Demirel, former Turkish Prime Minister and President 
The international media paid close attention when in April and May of 2007 hundreds of 
thousands of people in Turkey protested against the presidential aspirations of Foreign 
Minister Abdullah Gül of the conservative religious Justice and Development Party 
(AKP), which had held a majority in parliament since 2002, and the Turkish military in a 
memorandum openly threatened a coup against the AKP.1 The demonstrators and the 
military feared that Gül’s election would result in a massive Islamization of state, politics, 
and society, and could spell the end of the country’s republican form of government. 
After the Turkish constitutional court determined in a controversial decision that the 
Turkish parliament did not meet the quorum required for Gül’s election, Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called early parliamentary elections for July 22, 2007. The AKP was 
thus able to defuse the crisis for the short term; the following question, however, remains 
highly controversial: what role should Islam play in state, society, and politics? 
Turkey is the only Muslim country in which Islam is not the state religion, while 
laicism is enshrined in the constitution. In fact, however, Turkey is noticeably more 
Islamic today than in the 1960s and 1970s. So how much is there to the allegation of an 
“Islamist peril” in a country that is 99 percent Muslim and is seen by many as a 
democratic, secular model for Muslim countries in the 21st century?2 
Since the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the Kemalist secular state elite 
have justified their authoritarian policies with the reason that more democracy would 
pave the way to power for ultra-religious parties which could then establish a totalitarian 
state. In doing so, the Kemalist state elite have to battle two structural problems: 1. Islam 
is an integral part of Turkish identity and is used by the Kemalist elite itself as a second 
source of legitimacy, next to nationalism. 2. In accordance with the dogma “Islam is 
 
 
I am grateful to Matthias Dembinski, Sabine Mannitz, Achim Spanger and Zuhal Karakas for their com-
ments on the content, to Kersten Horn for editing the text and to Sarah Niemeyer, Tuna Özcan, Oliver 
Ulrich, Janina Voss and Fabian Wenner for the research they contributed to this article. 
1  Cf. “Grande manifestation contre le premier ministre turc à Ankara”, Le Monde, April 14, 2007; 
“Secularism v democracy: A military coup was avoided, but an early election looms. Turkey’s problems 
are postponed, not solved”, The Economist, May 3, 2007; “Der falsche Aufstand. Verkehrte Welt in der 
Türkei: Die muslimische Regierung ist nicht radikal, die Militärs müssen niemanden retten”, Die Zeit, 
May 3, 2007; “Turkey’s foreign minister withdraws Presidential candidacy”, International Herald Tribune, 
May 6, 2007; “Für Direktwahl des Präsidenten. Das türkische Volk soll künftig das Staatsoberhaupt 
bestimmen dürfen”, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, May 10, 2007. 
2  On Turkey as a role model for other Muslim countries see Vali Nasr, The Rise of Muslim Democracy, in: 
Journal of Democracy, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2005, pp. 13-27; also see the interview with Abdelwahab Meddeb in 
Die Zeit, September 21, 2006. 
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religion and state”, Islam is in essence not only a religion of the private but also of the 
public sphere – a strict separation of the two is therefore difficult to achieve. 
In Turkey, organizations and parties are banned whose goals are based on notions of 
an Islamist order, or which pursue anti-laicist objectives. Nevertheless, the Welfare Party 
(RP) in 1995 and the AKP in 2002 were able to win the parliamentary elections and 
through their actions and rhetoric contributed to an Islamization of state and society, 
even if their party platform was not Islamist per se. The toleration of the RP’s and AKP’s 
election victories and the parties’ actions serves well in highlighting the tensions that are 
inherent in the Turkish debate over state and religion: the integration of the democrati-
cally legitimized Islamist movement into Turkish politics and the simultaneous preserva-
tion of the strictly Kemalist laicist state policy. 
This report has three objectives: 
1. It examines the defining factors that characterized (a) Turkey’s path of secularization, 
and (b) the process of Islamization that can be observed in state and society in Turkey 
since the 1980s. 
2. At the same time, I analyze the phenomenon of the “politicization of Islam” (where 
“politicization” is to be understood as the abuse and exploitation of Islam for political, 
social, and economic purposes). Islamization and the politicization of Islam are in a 
reciprocal relationship and promote each other. Interestingly, the politicization of 
religion in Turkey takes place on two levels and with partially contrary goals. On the 
one hand, there is a politicization “from above”, i.e., on the part of the state, and on 
the other hand “from below”, i.e., on the part of parties and social groups and their 
political interests. This politicization follows not only the actor-oriented tensions of 
laicists vs. Islamists, but also the conflicts between Turkish and Kurdish nationalists 
and the oppression of the Alevis by the Sunnis. This report does not consider such 
conflicts individually but rather embedded in the overall chronological context. 
3. Finally, this study examines the policies and actions of the current governing party, the 
AKP. To what extent does the AKP pursue Islamist goals or politicize Islam? Has the 
AKP undergone honest programmatic change, turning it into an engine for reforms 
and democratization? Or does it engage in Takkiye – that is, “Islamic deception” – in 
order to achieve a certain (usually political) goal secretly and without conflict by con-
cealing its actual beliefs? This, at least, is the allegation leveled by the Turkish military’s 
Chief of Staff, Yaşar Büyükanıt. Upon taking office in October 2006, Büyükanıt stated 
that Islamism and the AKP’s politicization of religion represent the greatest danger to 
Turkey’s republican, laicist order.3 
This report begins with an analysis of diverging interpretations of secularism and laicism 
in Europe and Turkey. Europe serves as the comparative model due to the fact that there 
 
 
3    Cf. “Troubles ahead”, The Economist, October 19, 2006; “Der General spricht”, Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, October 4, 2006. 
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is no adequate laicist equivalent to Turkey in the Muslim world. This is followed by an 
analysis of the Turkish process of secularization, which began in the mid-19th century and 
was continued by Turkey’s founder Atatürk in his cultural revolution of the 1920s. Next, I 
will examine the institutionalization of the Islamist movement and then focus on the po-
litical turning point subsequent to the military coup of 1980, which was followed by an 
expansive Islamization “from above” and facilitated the rise of the Islamist movement. In 
what changes in the structure of state and society have these developments resulted? 
Against this background, I will then examine the objectives and policies of the current 
governing party, the AKP. 
I advance the following hypotheses in this study: 
1. The majority of Turkish society has accepted the subordination of Islam to politics. 
The process of secularization was an endogenous process (and not an exogenous one) 
and took place under Islamic auspices – factors decisive for the success of seculariza-
tion in Turkey. Nevertheless, Turkey has witnessed an increase in religious services and 
a strengthening of Islamic identity that is, however, not to be equated with Islamism as 
a political movement.  
2. The Kemalist model of laicism is both authoritarian and undemocratic. The Turkish 
state politicizes Islam “from above”, i.e., it has created a monopoly of interpretation 
and control over it. The goal is to secularize the population, homogenize differing 
confessional communities, and to ensure the country’s territorial integrity by propa-
gating a republican, laicist, and ethno-nationalist (“Turkifying”) state Islam. However, 
the Kemalist model of laicism unintentionally also facilitates the politicization of Islam 
“from below”, i.e., by parties and social groups. Their aim is less to transform Turkey 
into an Islamic state than to break the Kemalist monopoly on the interpretation and 
exegesis for Islam, to capitalize on anti-Western resentments, to win electoral votes 
from the Kurdish population, and to end the restrictions on religious freedom. 
3. The conservative religious AKP is not a danger to Turkish democracy – despite its 
occasionally Islamist rhetoric. The Kemalist elite’s criticism of AKP policies is above all 
a reflection of the fear that the Kemalist prerogative over state resources will be chal-
lenged. The AKP does not view the country’s future in Turkey’s deeper integration 
into the Muslim world (unlike the RP), but rather in the Western community of states 
and in the strengthening of democracy and the rule of law. The orientation of the 
AKP’s principles toward fundamental democratic values is an important process for 
the integration of the Islamic political movement into the republican order, one that 
has also made the party attractive to non-religious voters. 
1.2 Definition of Terms 
A few terms should be defined to avoid any ambiguity: 
The word Muslim is derived from the same root as the term “Islam” and means “one 
who surrenders”. Since 99 percent of Turks adhere to Islam, Turkish society is dominated 
by Muslims. The term Islamic has primarily a socio-cultural and ritual dimension. It 
describes thought and action based on the Koranic system of values, as well as the reli-
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gious duties of believers. Since the majority of Turks adhere to Islam, Turkish society can 
be described as Islamic. This report, however, makes the following distinction for the 
term’s use in the context of constitutional law: a state is an Islamic state when its constitu-
tion declares Islam the official state religion and at least parts of Islamic law (the Sharia; 
Turkish: Şeriat) are used in jurisprudence. None of these criteria apply to the case of 
Turkey. Consequently, Turkey is not an Islamic state, but a secular state with an Islamic 
society.4  
The terms Islamism and Islamist denote a political ideology in which Islam forms the 
core of a “revolutionary” identity. Claims for political and moral control are legitimized 
by invoking the “universal validity of the Koran”. Islam serves as a public norm or con-
stitution according to which politics must subordinate itself to religion in accordance with 
the dogma “Islam is religion and state” (“al-islam din wa daula”). All public life (society, 
culture, education, the economy) must adhere to religious standards in such a way that it 
is consistent with Islamic law. The ideological precursors of Islamism are the Iranian-
Afghani philosopher Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897) and the Egyptian teacher 
Hasan al-Bana (1906-1949). Al-Afghani championed a global pan-Islamism and called for 
the Islamic world to unite against the Western colonial powers. The first classic Islamist 
organization is the Muslim Brotherhood, founded by al-Bana in Egypt in 1928. It began as 
a protest movement against the imperialist and oppressive policies of the British and 
French colonial rulers. Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) is generally recognized as the most im-
portant Islamist thinker of the recent past. Qutb located the reasons for Muslim self-
alienation in the processes of secularization in the Muslim world and the global influence 
of non-Islamic civilizations. 
Islamists have as their goal the creation of an Islamic state. This, however, needs to be 
considered apart from the actual political implementation of this dogma. In common 
English usage, relatively liberal Islamic countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, and Jordan 
are referred to as “Islamic countries” along with totalitarian regimes such as Saudi Arabia, 
Sudan, and Afghanistan under the Taliban. The suggested distinction between “Islamic” 
and “Islamist” countries could perhaps provide greater clarity. 
Islamists also need to be distinguished by the means whereby they strive to attain their 
goals. Some operate within a parliamentary, democratic context (e.g., in Turkey, Jordan, 
and Morocco), others as militant underground movements and terrorists (e.g., in 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Egypt). In Turkey, Islamists make up approx. 10 percent of the 
country’s population.5 
 
 
4  For a definition also see Günter Seufert, Staat und Islam in der Türkei, Berlin (Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, Studie 29) 2004, p. 7. 
5  Ziya Öniş, Political Islam at the Crossroads. From Hegemony to Co-Existence, in: Contemporary Politics, 
Vol. 7, No. 4, 2001, pp. 281-298 (287). 
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Turkey is set apart by its heterogeneity, both in its population and in Islam. Around 55 
million Turks and 15 million Kurds live in Turkey. There are two confessional groups 
within Turkish Islam, the Sunnis (approx. 80-85 percent) and the Alevis (approx. 15-20 
percent). The Alevi community falls into two groups along ethnic lines: three quarters are 
Turks and one quarter are Kurds. Estimates of their number vary as the Turkish census 
does not distinguish between confessional groups within the category “Islam”.6 
The Sunni (Turkish: Suni) are members of the largest confessional group within Islam, 
accounting for around 85 percent of Muslims worldwide. Shiites only make up the ma-
jority of Muslims in Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, Azerbaijan, Yemen, Oman, and Lebanon. Sunni 
Islam recognizes five schools of legal thought (Madhhab), with Turkish Sunnis belonging 
to the Hanafi school. Sunnis live according to the “Five Pillars of Islam”. The pillars 
represent the basic religious duties of a Muslim: reciting the creed, praying five times a 
day, almsgiving, fasting during the month of Ramadan, and a pilgrimage to Mecca (Hajj). 
The main distinction from Shia Islam is the belief that the supreme leader, the calif, may 
be elected by his followers on the basis of his religious leadership and administrative skills. 
For Shiites, the calif cannot be elected but must be a legitimate successor of the Prophet 
Mohammed and of his son-in-law Ali. 
The Alevis (Turkish: Alevi) originated from the mystical brotherhood of the Persian 
Safavis in eastern Anatolia during the 13th century. The Alevi faith is the result of a de-
velopment in religious history that absorbed Christian and Gnostic elements and grew 
into an autonomous community. There are considerable differences between it and Sunni 
as well as Shiite Islam: Alevis do not adhere to the “Five Pillars of Islam” and do not pray 
in mosques but rather in their own community halls (Turkish: Cemevi). There is no sepa-
ration of men and women during religious worship, and women are not required to veil 
themselves. Nevertheless, there are parallels to Shia Islam: Alevis venerate Ali, the cousin 
and son-in-law of the Prophet Mohammed, and they recognize the twelve Shia imams. In 
the Ottoman Empire, Alevis were classified as heretics and persecuted by the Sunni 
government. The situation has improved little since the founding of the Turkish Republic 
(1923), with pogroms taking place in the 1970s and 1990s. 
Kemalism (Turkish: Kemalizm or Atatürkçülük) refers to the principles of the doctrine 
on society and state formulated by Turkey’s founder Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) in 1931. 
His six “foundations” are republicanism (“Cumhuriyetçilik”), nationalism (“Milliyet-
çilik”), populism (“Halkçılık”), statism (“Devletçilik”), laicism (“Lâiklik”) and revolu-
tionism/reformism (“Devrimçilik”).7 
 
 
6  M. Hakan Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, London (Oxford University Press) 2003, p. 65. 
7  Republicanism means that the Turkish Republic is based on the principle of popular sovereignty and no 
longer on the elitist Padişah system that characterized the Ottoman monarchy. Nationalism means that 
the republic was founded based on the idea of the nation-state and that the Turkish nation is the state’s 
people. Populism describes the need of the people to participate in the state with its rights and obligations. 
Statism describes the dirigiste and statist Turkish economic policies that predominated until 1980. Laicism 
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The terms Kemalist state elite and Kemalist state bureaucracy denote institutions of the 
state that are by their very function duty bound to enforce the Kemalist principles. Among 
them are the Turkish military and the National Security Council (MGK, Milli Güvenlik 
Kurulu); the office of the President; the Council of State (Turkey’s highest court) and the 
Chief Public Prosecutor; large parts of the state bureaucracy, especially the Turkish 
Foreign Ministry, the Ministry for National Education (MEB, Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı), the 
Council of Higher Education (YÖK, Yükseköğretim Kurulu), as well as the Radio and 
Television Supreme Council (RTÜK, Radio ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu).  
The term Kemalists originally referred to Turkey’s founder Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) 
and his entourage. Today’s usage is broader and includes – in addition to the Kemalist 
state bureaucracy – individuals, non-governmental organizations and institutions that 
declare their support for the ideals of Atatürk. This includes the Republican People’s Party 
(CHP, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi); the large-business association TÜSIAD; parts of the 
media, especially the newspaper Cumhuriyet and those belonging to the Doğan group, 
including the high-circulation dailies Hürriyet and Milliyet; center-left unions and 
women’s rights groups; as well as large parts of the Alevi community. 
2.  Diverging Interpretations of Secularism and Laicism  
in Europe and Turkey 
2.1 Secularism and Laicism in Europe 
Not many words produce associations as diverging as does the term “secularism”. Over 
the course of several centuries of cultural conflict, a dividing line emerged between pro-
gress and reaction, and – in analogous fashion – between the Enlightenment and 
Christian ethos. With the Renaissance, the Enlightenment and new scientific insights set 
off a relativization of Christian dogmas; these went hand in hand with a marginalization 
of aristocratic and clerical authority in favor of a new bourgeoisie and its demands for 
political power (popular sovereignty). This process of desacralization was accompanied by 
an increasing individualization of society. During the first half of the 20th century the 
Western idea of secularization took its cue from Max Weber’s sociology of religion. 
Weber saw secularization as part of a sweeping process of modernization that encom-
passed both state and society.8 Today’s understanding of the idea is more nuanced. José 
 
 
means the institutional separation of state and religion; however, a distinct Turkish definition has evolved 
that will be discussed in detail below. Revolutionism/Reformism denotes Turkey’s continuous ability to 
adapt to Europe and the West. Cf. Udo Steinbach, Die Türkei im 20. Jahrhundert. Schwieriger Partner 
Europas, Bergisch-Gladbach (Lübbe) 1996, pp. 139-142. 
8  Max Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie I, Tübingen (J.C.B. Mohr/Paul Siebeck) 1920, 
pp. 536-573. 
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Casanova, for example, distinguishes three aspects of secularization: the divorcement of 
temporal domains from religious institutions and norms, and the former’s emancipation 
from the latter; the decline of religious conviction and behavioral norms; and the con-
finement of religion to the private sphere.9 
Secularism has been accepted as a normative model and integral part of the modern 
constitutional state. The concepts are, however, very heterogeneous with regard to the 
degree of separation between state and religion in Europe. They show that secularization 
is defined less as a process of desacralization and more as one of differentiation of reli-
gious and nonreligious spheres that need not exclude one another:10 
– For example, Germany has a system of concord which provides among other things 
that the state’s fiscal authorities levy a tax on behalf of the church and that Christian 
holidays enjoy legal protection. Religious education is a statutory school subject, and 
crucifixes can be found on the walls of schools and courtrooms in many of the tradi-
tionally Catholic regions in Germany. Moreover, in contrast to Turkey, political par-
ties are permitted to base their programs on religious ideas (as in the case, for example, 
of the Christian-democratic parties CDU/CSU). 
– In the Netherlands the process of secularization has produced the so-called pillariza-
tion model. Catholics, Protestants and other religious groups each form one “pillar” of 
society within which they maintain their own institutions, including parties, clubs and 
institutions in the health, education and media sectors. The cost of private educational 
institutions is borne by the state – this is not just the case for Christian but also for 
Muslim institutions. 
– Also interesting is the idea of secularism in Great Britain, where the Anglican state 
church emerged in the 16th century. The head of the Anglican Church is not the Pope 
but rather the British head of state, i.e., currently Queen Elizabeth II. The state church 
enjoys certain privileges – for example, the bishops of the Anglican Church are mem-
bers of the upper house of the British Parliament. At the same time, canon law is part 
of the temporal legal system, and bishops are appointed jointly by the Prime Minister 
and the head of state. 
These three examples demonstrate that an apodictic separation of state and religion is not 
a prerequisite for a functioning democracy. While all three countries possess a secular 
system of law, none of them is laicist. The term “laicism” refers to an anticlerical world-
view and ideology that are based on secular processes. It provides for a strict institutional 
 
 
9  Cf. José Casanova, Chancen und Gefahren öffentlicher Religion. Ost- und Westeuropa im Vergleich, in: 
Otto Kallscheuer (ed.), Das Europa der Religionen. Ein Kontinent zwischen Säkularisierung und Funda-
mentalismus, Frankfurt a.M. (Fischer) 1996, pp. 181-210 (182). 
10  Heiner Bielefeldt, Säkularisierung. Ein schwieriger Begriff: Versuch einer praktischen Orientierung, in: 
Mathias Hildebrandt/Manfred Brocker/Hartmut Behr (eds.), Säkularisierung und Resakralisierung in 
weltlichen Gesellschaften. Ideengeschichtliche und theoretische Perspektiven, Wiesbaden (Westdeutscher 
Verlag) 2001, pp. 29-42 (29-30). 
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separation of state and religion, i.e., of political and religious authority. Accordingly, 
unlike under secularism, the laicist state keeps completely out of all religious matters. 
France and Portugal are the only constitutionally laicist states in Europe. Laicism is 
seen there as a necessary prerequisite for the protection of the freedoms of religion and 
conscience and the only way of ensuring equal status for all religious, political and phi-
losophical views; but it is, therefore, bound to neutrality toward all religions. The French 
understanding of laicism is especially rigid: no crucifixes may be displayed in public 
buildings, e.g., courts, hospitals, and schools, as this would discriminate against non-
Christians. Due to this obligation of neutrality, headscarves may no longer be worn in 
schools. Laicism is further distinguished from secularism by the fact that no state support 
is provided to religious groups.11 
2.2 The “Kemalist Tripod” of Religion, Nation, and Laicism 
Although in Turkey the term laicism (Turkish: Lâiklik) is used, the practical political ob-
jective of Turkish laicism is secularization. The constitutional court defines laicism, which 
has been part of the constitution since 1937, as “a civilized way of life that forms the basis 
for an understanding of freedom and democracy, for independence, national sovereignty, 
and the humanist ideal, which have developed as a result of overcoming medieval dogma-
tism in favor of the primacy of reason and enlightened sciences.” Moreover, the court 
determined that “in a laicist order […] religion is freed from politicization, is discarded as 
an instrument of power, and is assigned the proper and honorable place in the conscience 
of the citizens.”12 
Turkish laicism thus has as its goal the secularization and modernization of state and 
society while at the same time freeing religion from politicization. But to what extent do 
constitutional aspiration and reality in Turkey coincide? Two central structural problems 
mark the Kemalist system: the fusing of religion and nation and the simultaneous co-op-
tation of Islam. The specifically Turkish path of secularization is an amalgam of religion, 
nation, and laicism that is unique not just among Islamic societies but worldwide. This 
amalgam can be called the “Kemalist tripod”. 
The fusing of nation and religion is a result of the Turkish War of Independence 
(1919-22) and the transformation of the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire into a European-
style nation-state. Turkey’s founder Atatürk was impressed by the unifying power of 
religion in building a nation, as in the cases of Serbia and Greece. He stressed the ideas of 
nation and popular movement but – since he was dependent on the loyalty of the Anato-
lian peoples – did not specify which interpretation of these ideas he intended. Conse-
 
 
11  Henri Pena-Ruiz, Histoire de la laïcité. Genèse d'un idéal, Paris (Gallimard) 2005. 
12  Cited in Christian Rumpf, Fundamentalismus und Religionsfreiheit in der Türkei in Verfassung, Recht 
und Praxis, in: Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ), Vol. 32, 1999, pp. 164-190 (166). 
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quently, Atatürk enjoyed the support not only of the Sunnis but also of the Kurds and the 
Alevis. The Alevis, who had been persecuted in the Ottoman Empire, were expecting more 
rights in the new republic; the Kurds were hoping for legal recognition as a separate, 
autonomous ethnic group. After the Ottoman Empire’s painful territorial losses in the 
Balkans and the Middle East, Atatürk’s greatest fear was a further fragmentation of Turkey 
along ethnic and religious lines in its Anatolian heartland, and both groups’ hopes there-
fore remained unfulfilled. Atatürk’s fear has remained virulent even to this day among the 
Kemalist state elite.13 
Immediately after the state’s founding (1923) began the Kemalist cultural revolution 
and educational dictatorship with the goal of Westernization. No other Muslim state has 
experienced anything this radical: all Koranic schools, religious orders and religious edu-
cational institutions were closed; Islamic law was replaced by Swiss civil law, German 
trade and commercial law, and Italian criminal law; Arabic script was replaced by the 
Latin script, and the Gregorian calendar replaced the Islamic one; active and passive fe-
male suffrage was introduced, along with compulsory education; regulations promoting 
Western-style dress were passed and the display of religious symbols in enclosed public 
places (public schools, universities, hospitals, state buildings, etc.) banned – this is inci-
dentally the only parallel to French laicism.14 
Although these reforms were met with – sometimes significant – opposition, especially 
in the Kurdish southeastern areas of the country, no national mass protest movement 
developed that could have seriously endangered the Kemalist state-building project. The 
majority of the Turkish population had accepted the subordination of religion to the 
state. Atatürk was able to take advantage of the century-old process of secularization that 
had been embarked upon by Ottoman Sultans Mahmud II and Abdülmecid I in the first 
half of the 19th century and that was aimed at opening the Empire to transfers of 
knowledge and technology: they had proclaimed, for the first time, human and civil 
rights, abolished the feudal system, and carried out administrative reforms, including a 
reorganization of the state bureaucracy and the military modeled after Prussia’s.15  
To facilitate the implementation of the reforms and the introduction of a constitution 
(1876), which transformed the multi-ethnic empire into a constitutional democracy with 
a bicameral parliament based on Belgium’s system, the Sultans had presented the adop-
tion of European laws and reforms as the fulfillment of religious law and had legitimated 
this with verses from the Koran. These so-called “Tanzimat” reforms had initiated the end 
of the centuries-old dogma “Islam is religion and state” in Turkey and formed the basis 
 
 
13  Günter Seufert/Christopher Kubaseck, Die Türkei. Politik, Geschichte, Kultur, München (C.H. Beck) 
2004, pp. 148f. 
14  For a critical analysis of the Kemalist cultural revolution also see Erik Jan Zürcher, Turkey. A Modern 
History, London (I.B. Tauris) 2004. 
15  Cf. Brigitte Moser/Michael W. Weithmann, Die Türkei. Nation zwischen Europa und dem Nahen Osten, 
Regensburg (Friedrich Pustet) 2002, pp. 46f. 
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for the country’s Europeanization. It was of pivotal importance for the success of the re-
forms that the modernization of the empire be an endogenous process and proceed under 
the auspices of Islam. Since the Ottoman Empire had never been colonized, the process of 
Europeanization was regarded by some parts of the population with astonishment. It was 
nevertheless accepted and was scarcely regarded as cultural imperialism or foreign rule. 
The creation of the Turkish nation under the aegis of Islam forced the Kemalists to be 
considerate of religious sentiment – after all, (Sunni) Islam had been the foundation of 
the Ottoman Empire’s social and cultural order for almost 1000 years. In order to secure 
religious support while at the same time imparting republican ideas, the Kemalists de-
veloped an impetus that propagated – in differentiating itself from the “regressive” popu-
lar Islam16 preached by the religious orders and brotherhoods – a modern, pro-laicist state 
Islam. The Kemalist state had thus created for itself a monopoly of interpretation, i.e., sole 
exegetical authority for Sunni Islam and in doing so committed itself to supporting it. 
One year after the proclamation of the republic, the Presidency for Religious Affairs 
(Diyanet Işleri Başkanlığı; “Diyanet” for short) was founded in 1924 with the goal of per-
manently depoliticizing majority Sunni Islam through a state takeover of certain religious 
functions and integrating it into the Kemalist state-building project.  
Initially, the Kemalists set out to reform Islam. In 1927 Atatürk founded a committee on 
religion under the leadership of Mehmet Fuad Köprülü, a historian and scholar of religion. 
The goal was to Europeanize (Turkish) Islam and make it compatible with Atatürk’s own 
impetus for modernization. The Çağdaş Islam postulated by the Kemalists was “rational” 
and “enlightened”, and tailored toward republicanism and Turkish nationalism. Çağdaş 
Islam was not propagated as a dissociation from Islam but, interestingly, as an “Islamic 
Reformation”. This prompted the translation of the Koran from Arabic into Turkish, 
following the example of Luther’s translation of the Bible into German (to replace the Latin 
version in use in the Roman Catholic Church). The committee also proposed that Muslim 
prayer times should no longer be aligned with the path of the sun but instead with the 
rhythm of the work day. In addition, calls to prayer and sermons were supposed to be no 
longer in Arabic but in Turkish, and prayers at the mosque were no longer to be performed 
while kneeling but instead – like in Christian churches – while sitting in pews. But the 
propagation of a “Kemalist Islam” was an affront to many believers, and protests ensued. 
Consequently, only the proposal to recite the call to prayer in Turkish (which happened 
from 1928 to 1950) was taken up.17 
 
 
16  The Kemalists held especially the influence of popular Islam responsible for the technological backward-
ness of the Ottoman Empire, which is why the religious orders and brotherhoods were outlawed in the 
1920s. Popular Islam is an amalgamation of local customs and traditions, the veneration of saints, mystic 
and folkloric elements, as well as Islamic behavioral codes. Islamic mysticism (Sufism) and popular Islam 
are often more popular in non-Arab societies such as the Turkish one. Cf. Annemarie Schimmel, Mysti-
sche Dimensionen des Islams. Die Geschichte des Sufismus, München (Insel) 1985. 
17  Yavuz, see above (footnote 6), pp. 46-50. 
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In order to avoid further provocations, the Kemalist state pulled back from its 
attempts at a reformation, although its educational impetus of propagating a pro-laicist 
state Islam remained virulent. Through the laicist interpretation of religion and by relay-
ing this interpretation to the population, the Diyanet was supposed to prevent non-state 
and anti-Kemalist circles from using religion for political mobilization against the state. 
Out of this overarching objective evolved a laicist system sui generis. In pursuit of this 
goal, the Kemalists proceeded as follows:18 
1. All legal matters that were connected to religious law and its prescriptions regarding 
state and society were from then on to be dealt with by the Turkish parliament. 
2. All questions of theology, faith, and religious ritual were to be decided upon by the 
Diyanet. The new state institution was to be solely responsible for overseeing the 
mosques, for the organization of worship, and for the discussion of religious affairs 
that exclusively involved matters of faith. The Islamic law scholars (Ulema) and the 
traditionally non-organized clergy were made subordinate to the Diyanet, which thus 
functioned as a “substitute church”. 
Over the years, the Diyanet’s responsibilities were extended further. Today it is one of the 
largest institutions in Turkey. It oversees the almost 78,000 state mosques and 5,000 state 
Koran schools (2006: 157,000 students). Other tasks are: preparing and distributing the 
Friday sermons centrally from Ankara to all mosques in the country; designing the con-
tent of broadcasts about Islam and of Koran recitations in the state media; translating 
religious texts; writing Islamic legal reports and opinions (Fatwa) on such topics as forced 
marriages, artificial insemination, environmental protection, compulsory education for 
girls, or “chatting” on the Internet; organizing and regulating pilgrimages to Mecca; and 
religious care for Turkish Muslims abroad (the Diyanet is also active in Europe, where it is 
known under the acronym DITIB).19 
The Diyanet currently employs 80,000 people, many of them prayer leaders, preachers, 
and legal scholars. Most clergy are state employees and obliged to uphold the laicist prin-
ciples of the republic; their right to political activity is limited by law. The Diyanet is the 
only state agency in which female employees may wear headscarves and where the presi-
dent is permitted to work in his religious attire. The agency’s resources of approx. 1.3 
billion YTL (about 700 million Euros) in 2006 represented the fourth-largest item in the 
state’s budget. The money is not only used to pay the preachers’ salaries but also for the 
maintenance of the mosques and the construction of new ones. The agency is led by a 
theology professor (currently Ali Bardakoğlu) who is appointed by and answers to the 
Turkish Prime Minister. 
 
 
18  Christian Rumpf, Das Präsidium für Religionsangelegenheiten, in: Zeitschrift für Türkeistudien, Vol. 2, 
No. 1, 1989, pp. 21-35. 
19  See the homepage of the state agency for religious affair, also available in English, at www. diyanet.gov.tr/ 
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Polls conducted annually since the mid-1990s by the Turkish Economic and Social 
Studies Foundation (TESEV) show that the republican reforms to modernize the country 
and the subordination of religion to politics or the placement of Islam under state control 
meet with broad popular approval. In the most recent survey from 2006, 77 percent of all 
respondents answered “Yes” to the question whether the republican reforms had been 
advantageous to Turkey. About three quarters of the Turkish population see no contra-
diction between the principle of laicism and the existence of a state agency for religion. An 
equally large number also believe that the agency has a moderating influence on religion 
and thus prevents it from becoming radicalized. These results have largely remained con-
stant over the past decade.20 
My analysis shows that the Turkish Republic has successfully accomplished the trans-
formation from a multi-religious and multi-ethnic empire into a European nation-state. 
This was accomplished by utilizing Turkish nationalism and Sunni Islam. The hegemony of 
Turkishness and the religious homogeneity were designed to strengthen territorial integrity 
and the formation of a national identity. The state was founded on a paradox: the Kemalist 
republic itself had become a project for building the nation, not vice versa. The “Tanzimat” 
reforms, the Kemalist educational dictatorship and the promotion of a republican, laicist 
state Islam played a significant part in secularizing state and society. But the Kemalist 
understanding of laicism is a discriminatory one: although the state agency for religious 
affairs is also funded through the tax payments from Christians21 and Alevis, who make up 
no less than 15 to 20 percent of the Turkish and Kurdish population, the Diyanet is only 
responsible for the promotion of majority Sunni Islam. The Kemalist state has thus not only 
abandoned its obligation of religious neutrality, but de facto promoted Sunni Islam to the 
status of a state religion. 
3.  Politicization of Religion “from below”:  
The Institutionalization of the Islamist Movement 
With the transition to democracy and a multi-party system (1946) also began the compe-
tition for votes and thus the exploitation and politicization of religion “from below”. Re-
ligion developed into an important tool for gaining and retaining power. Islam henceforth 
became an integral part of the program of all center-right parties, which in turn could 
count on the financial and electoral support of religious interest groups. The minoritarian 
Kemalist leadership and its party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) – which had ruled 
for over two decades in a one-party regime – was now confronted with the religious, 
 
 
20  Cf. TESEV survey on religion, society, and politics (2006) at www.tesev.org.tr/etkinlik/Final%20Rapor-
din_toplum.pdf 
21  There are an estimated 100,000 to 150,000 Christians in Turkey. The two largest groups are the Greek 
Orthodox and the Syrian Orthodox communities. 
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conservative and rural majority of the population, then at least 75 percent of the Turkish 
population. The CHP felt forced to widen its edict of religious toleration and to reverse 
many of Atatürk’s provisions: (voluntary) religious education was added to the elemen-
tary school curriculum in 1948. Schools for the training of preachers (Imam Hatip 
schools) and in 1949 a college of theology at the University of Ankara were opened in 
order to meet the new demand for teachers of religion. 
Already during the electoral campaign of 1950 seven of 24 parties advocated a greater 
role for religion. The victory of the conservative religious Democratic Party (DP, Demo-
krat Partisi) of Adnan Menderes signified a comprehensive return of Islam to the public 
sphere. This was followed by a boom in the construction of mosques; new state Koran 
classes and theological colleges were established. The DP had become an institutionalized 
“catch all” party for those who were weary of elitist Kemalism: peasants, small business-
men, members of religious orders and brotherhoods, and especially the inhabitants of the 
Anatolian periphery.22 
In 1960, the Turkish Army carried out a coup in order to prevent a “civil war”. The 
CHP, which persistently warned against the danger of the “religious reaction” (Turkish: 
Irtica), had successfully called for a Kemalist counter-movement. Prime Minister 
Menderes was sentenced to death for “high treason”, and the DP was outlawed. Causes for 
the coup were not only the mass demonstrations against Menderes’s politics of clientelism 
for owners of large estates but also his drastic crack-down on “leftist Kemalists” and 
communists, his ban on strikes, and press censorship.23 
The coup of 1960 represented a turning point in Turkish politics. The Turkish consti-
tution was amended to establish a National Security Council (MGK) dominated by the 
military, which henceforth acted as an “advisory controlling body” vis-à-vis the govern-
ment and watched over the compatibility of domestic and foreign policy with Kemalism. 
This meant a distinction between the interests of the state and those of the people. Thus 
the primacy of the state’s power over that of the people was established. Moreover the 
army pledged in articles 35 and 85.1 of the military’s 1961 “Internal Rules of Conduct” 
(“Iç Hizmet Kanunu”) “to protect and defend the principles of the Republic according to 
the Constitution” and “to defend the country against domestic and foreign threats, if nec-
essary by force”. The military thus granted itself license for future interventions. 
The strict course of modernization and industrialization that followed in the 1960s 
resulted in unemployment, hyperinflation and migration to the cities. It increased anti-
Western sentiment and raised questions of national identity for many Turks. Out of this 
mood developed in the late 1960s for the first time a political movement that saw its 
ideology rooted in Islamist principles. Leadership of this movement was assumed by 
Necmettin Erbakan, the “grand old man” of the Islamist movement in Turkey. Erbakan, a 
 
 
22  Moser/Weithmann, see above (footnote 15), pp. 153f. 
23  Ibid.  
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professor of mechanical engineering with a degree from the technical university at 
Aachen, Germany, was an adherent of the Naqshbandi Sheik Mehmed Zahid Kotku 
(1897-1980). Kotku was one of the first clergy to abandon the “cultural Islam” of the 
Turkish conservatives and had a large influence on the formation of “political Islam” in 
Turkey. Kotku’s discourses on Islam in the 1960s discussed texts by Pakistani and 
Egyptian Islamist ideologues, evoked the Ottoman past, made Westernization responsible 
for Turkey’s economic and moral decline, and debated the resounding defeat of the Arab 
alliance by Israel in the Six-Day War (1967). Islamism was posited as a new paradigm to 
take the place of declining pan-Arab nationalism and its original model, Kemalism.24 
When Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel of the Justice Party (AP, Adalet Partisi) de-
nied Erbakan a position on the party list that would ensure that he would be elected in the 
next parliamentary election, Erbakan left the AP and founded the National Order Party 
(MNP, Milli Nizam Partisi) in 1970. The MNP became the institutionalized branch of the 
Islamist movement. In addition to the protection of conservative moral values, the party’s 
platform focused on economic policy goals, such as state-led industrialization, the expan-
sion of heavy industry, and the protection of small businesses. It also polemicized against 
Turkey’s association with the European Community (EC), which was established in 1964 
and was decried by the MNP as commercially disadvantageous to Turkey.25 
1971 saw Turkey’s second military coup. The student revolts of 1968 had also seized 
Turkey and intensified the violent conflict between the extreme left and right. After the 
coup, which had resulted in a far-reaching ban of political parties, Erbakan’s party recon-
stituted itself just one year later as the National Salvation Party (MSP, Milli Selamet 
Partisi). In order to be (re-)admitted, Erbakan had kept the party program on a pro-
Kemalist line but had nevertheless emphasized new directions. Milli Görüş (“National 
Outlook”) emphasized the strengthening of moral and religious values in educational 
matters as well as fighting against exploitation, usury, and corruption. The MSP was the 
first party to demand a state investment program for the Kurdish southeastern part of the 
country, which had been neglected for decades. Moreover, although laicism was accepted, 
the program advocated revoking the state’s authority over religion.26 
In the 1973 parliamentary elections the MSP unexpectedly became the third-strongest 
party with 11.8 percent of the vote, and it enjoyed the most support in the Kurdish 
periphery and the economically neglected areas of central Anatolia. It also became evident 
that Demirel’s AP had only absorbed the “Islam of the better-off”, but not that of the 
lower strata of society. Ironically, it was the Kemalist CHP under the leadership of Bülent 
Ecevit that would allow the Islamist MSP to come to power. In a coalition consisting of 
 
 
24  Yavuz, see above (footnote 6), pp. 141f. 
25  Steinbach, see above (footnote 7), p. 181. 
26  Melih Yürüsen/Atilla Yayla, Die Türkische Wohlfahrtspartei, Sankt Augustin (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 
Interne Studien No. 134) 1997, p. 30. 
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leftist nationalists and Islamists, a constellation that has remained unique to this day, the 
MSP assumed the responsibilities of government from January to November of 1974. The 
most consequential decision of this coalition was the deployment of Turkish troops to 
Cyprus. The government exacerbated the disagreements between the EC, the United 
States and Turkey to such an extent that Washington placed Turkey under an arms em-
bargo that would last several years.  
Prompted by the strong criticism of its Western allies, Turkey intensified its search for 
alternative alliances. Its accession to the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) as 
a full member can be seen as a direct consequence of these efforts. Erbakan’s MSP profited 
from the anti-Western sentiment that was then widespread. At that time several groups 
first emerged around it that not only demanded to expand the edict of religious toleration 
but, with an eye on publicity, shouted “Allahu ekber” (“God is great”) at MSP party con-
ferences and displayed Islamist symbols (such as green banners with Koranic verses) un-
der the party symbol the “crescent with ear of grain”. Erbakan’s MSP publicly polemicized 
against the “Zionism” and the “Israel-friendly” policies of the United States and de-
manded that parts of Turkish law be “brought into line” with Islamic law.27 
Due to smart coalitioneering, Erbakan was successful in joining two rightist national 
parties in the second half of the 1970s and was able to engage in clientelism. As a result, 
the number of mosques rose from 43,000 (1972) to 57,000 (1983), and that of schools for 
the training of preachers increased from 36 (1960) to 437 (1979).28 However, this expan-
sion was not only pushed by the center-right parties and the Islamists, but also by the 
Kemalist CHP. It was not a new piousness that had made this necessary, but rather the 
rapid population growth, which had seen the number of Turks triple from 15 million 
(1940) to 44 million (1980).  
My analysis demonstrates that the electoral victory of Adnan Menderes in 1950 was an 
important turning point in Turkish history, especially from a psychological point of view: 
from then on, the religious strata of the population viewed political power no longer as an 
administrative tool for pushing through an elitist state-building project but instead as a 
participatory instrument for asserting its own interests. The liberal stance of Prime 
Minister Menderes’s policies vis-à-vis Islam prevented the splintering off or radicalization 
of religious groups. Their integration into the parliamentary system expanded the social 
and political legitimacy of the state. Even if Menderes can be accused of exploiting reli-
gious sentiment, his rhetoric was not Islamist but anti-elitist and populist.29  
Moreover, my analysis shows that Islamism in Turkey did not begin its political role as 
a “revolutionary underground movement”, but emerged from a democratic, parliamen-
 
 
27  Steinbach, see above (footnote 7), pp. 181f. 
28  Yavuz, see above (footnote 6), p. 124. 
29  Günter Seufert, Neue pro-islamische Parteien in der Türkei, Berlin (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 
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tarian environment. Erbakan’s two parties represented not only the rights of people with 
religious interests in a pluralist process of political expression, but also marked out the 
terms under which parties with Islamist goals could operate and the circumstances under 
which they could participate in government. 
4.  The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (TIS) and the Re-Politicization 
of Religion “from above” 
On September 12, 1980, the Turkish military carried out another coup d’état. It assumed 
political leadership until the 1983 parliamentary elections and triggered a turning point in 
state policy. The coup was preceded by a period of instability that wore out a total of thir-
teen different governments during the 1970s. The main reason for this instability in do-
mestic politics was the enormous radicalization of parts of the political left as well as of 
the rightist nationalist and the Islamist camps, a development that brought Turkey to the 
brink of civil war. Acts of terrorism during this time, however, were not only perpetrated 
on the basis of political ideologies – confessional groups such as the Alevis and the 
Kurdish nationalists were used for factional political fights. There were 1,126 political 
assassinations in 1979, a number that climbed until the military coup to 1,500 for the 
period from January to September 1980 alone.30 
In addition to the domestic conflicts, there were also signs of trouble in Turkey’s for-
eign affairs. The overthrow of the Shah and his regime in Iran by radical Islamists in Feb-
ruary 1979 raised concerns in the United States that the “Islamic revolution”, which had 
many sympathizers among Turkish Islamists, would spill over into Turkey. Ayatollah 
Khomeini made clear his feeling that he saw the Turkish Republic as a threat to Islam 
greater than the United States, because Turkey’s transformation into a laicist state had 
been carried out from “within”. In response, the U.S. ended its arms embargo against 
Ankara that had been in place since the Cyprus crisis and raised its military presence in 
the Turkish-Iranian border region.  
In addition, enormous socioeconomic problems like mass unemployment and infla-
tion exacerbated the domestic situation while strikes paralyzed public life for days on end. 
The situation worsened when, on September 6, 1980, at a rally in Konya organized by 
Erbakan’s MSP, about 40,000 Islamists not only demonstrated against the welfare cut-
backs but also declared the transformations in Iran a model for Turkey and chanted anti-
Kemalist slogans. After this event, the military’s “intervention” had not only been de-
manded by large parts of the Turkish population, but also by the West.31 
 
 
30  Moser/Weithmann, see above (footnote 15), pp. 188-191. 
31  Steinbach, see above (footnote 7), p. 112. 
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After the coup, the military imposed martial law. The government and parliament 
were dissolved; strikes and demonstrations were outlawed. The military implemented 
drastic measures to restore public order: it banned all parties and embarked on an exten-
sive program of registering and “cleansing” individuals. Around 1.7 million people were 
registered as “politically suspect”, and 650,000 were arrested; 517 death sentences were 
imposed, 49 of which were carried out; 388,000 persons were barred from leaving the 
country; 30,000 political activists were expelled from Turkey; 14,000 Turks had their citi-
zenship revoked. Tens of thousands of people were dismissed from the civil service for 
having violated their duty of political neutrality. More than 600 associations, clubs and 
foundations were banned. Compulsory voting was introduced, together with a new ten-
percent electoral threshold for parliamentary elections. Through the unusually high 
threshold the military hoped to establish an American-style two-party system that was 
aimed at excluding Kurdish, communist, and Islamist parties and that seemed to promise 
greater political stability.32 
In addition to the economic transformation promoted by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the military embarked on a process of political transformation that took 
place on an ideological and discursive level and was characterized by the Cold War and 
the conservatism of the Thatcher/Reagan era: under the auspices of the Turkish-Islamic 
Synthesis (TIS, Türk-Islam Sentezi), Kemalist state policy was given an Islamic “veneer” 
and was supplemented with a metaphysical component. At its core, the TIS glorifies a 
crude marriage of Turkishness and (Sunni) Islam, according to which only Islam leads to 
a “refinement of the steppe and nomad culture” of the Turks who had migrated to Asia 
Minor from central Asia. The Turks, in their hearts, felt closer to Islam than to Buddhism, 
Christianity or Judaism, despite of their pre-Islamic and central Asian culture. Only 
through the fusion of Turkishness and Islam could Islam become a world power and ex-
plain the “eminence” of the Ottoman Empire, thus the claim.33 
This re-politicization of Islam by the military leadership, the most far-reaching since 
the founding of the republic, was aimed at a state-led Islamization “from above”. The 
following considerations played a role in this process: 
1. The TIS, by employing a state-led religious, authoritarian ideology of education, was 
supposed to counter the process of political and social disintegration that had been 
ongoing since the end of the 1960s. The propagation of the fascistic tripod of barracks, 
mosque and family placed a renewed emphasis on religious principles such as the fear 
of God and obedience to state authority.34 To the guardians of Kemalism, Islam seemed 
 
 
32  Yavuz, see above (footnote 6), pp. 69f. 
33  The term TIS was coined in 1972 by historian Ibrahim Kafesoğlu in the nationalist club for intellectuals 
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to be the only way of stemming the rising tides of individualization and political radi-
calization – especially that of the communists – through Islam’s socially integrating 
authority. To this end, one of the central authoritarian measures of the military regime 
was the introduction of religious education as a compulsory subject in the schools – it 
had been voluntary from 1948 until 1982. To this day, classes are tailored toward a 
Sunni and ethno-nationalist Islam and also have the objective of “Turkifying” Kurdish 
and “Sunnifying” Alevi children. 
2. Through the nationalization of Islam and the emphasis on Turkishness in Islam envi-
sioned by the TIS, the military tried to contain the influence of non-Turkish Islamist 
modes of thinking that had been gathering strength since the end of the 1960s, ema-
nating especially from the Arab region and Pakistan. Moreover, it hoped to offer an 
ideological counterpart to offset the effects of the “Islamic Revolution” in Iran. 
3. The process of socioeconomic transformation and liberalization initiated by the mili-
tary leadership was aimed not only at opening markets but it also provided for massive 
cutbacks in welfare benefits paid by the state. The ideological revaluation of religion 
and the expansion of state religious services were designed to create or “buy” a spiri-
tual compensation for material losses: the number of mosques grew from 57,000 in 
1983 to 72,000 in 1987. In the same vein, the number of state-run Koran classes rose 
from 2,160 in 1983 to 4,890 in 1990, and that of theological colleges from eight to 22 
during the same period.35 
The Diyanet, the Presidency for Religious Affairs, also attracted the attention of the TIS 
ideologues. Article 136 of the 1982 constitution drawn up by the military, in which inci-
dentally the word “Islamic” does not occur a single time (just like in its predecessor) and 
which is in force to this day, stipulates that the Presidency for Religious Affairs is supposed 
to contribute to “national solidarity and integration”. Since then, the Diyanet “interfaces” its 
sermons, recitations and Koran classes with views on Turkish national pride, respect for 
state authority and the adherence to law and order. To meet this new responsibility, the 
Presidency increased its staff from 50,765 (1979) to 84,172 (1989).36  
Up until the 1980 coup it was the Diyanet’s responsibility to train only “good, diligent, 
pro-laicist” Muslims. Since then, it is also supposed to educate the Kurdish population to 
be “loyal Turkish citizens”. For this purpose, the military founded an additional depart-
ment within the Diyanet, the Irsad Dairesi. This department organized conferences and 
meetings in the Kurdish areas in order to warn against the “godless” Marxist ideology of 
the Kurdish separatists surrounding the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK, Partiya Karkerên 
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Kurdistan). In cooperation with the Diyanet and well into the 1990s, the military drew up 
leaflets and dropped them over the Kurdish areas. The leaflets called for a super-ethnic 
Islamic community and were supplemented with verses from the Koran. The Kurds were 
called upon to fight for their families, their faith and the indivisibility of their (Turkish) 
home country, and against the “enemy from within”, the PKK.37 
My analysis shows that the 1980 military coup, initiated under the auspices of the 
Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, led to a turning point in Turkish politics: the expansion of 
state-run religious services, the introduction of religious education as a compulsory 
school subject and the use of the Diyanet for the “promotion of national solidarity and 
integration” not only led to a nationalization of Islam, but also to an Islamization of the 
nation. By propagating an ethno-nationalist Islam, the military acted to counter what had 
remained its greatest fear since the founding of the republic, namely the fragmentation of 
Turkey not only along the dividing line of laicists vs. Islamists (the constitutional dimen-
sion), but also along the line of Turkish vs. Kurdish nationalists (the ethnic dimension) 
and Sunnis vs. Alevis (the religious dimension). The military accepted the purposeful 
marginalization of Turkey’s Kurdish and Alevi identity. With the TIS, the issue was now 
no longer a “more or less” extensive expansion of the state’s edict of toleration vis-à-vis 
religion. Rather, Islam was granted an important role in the sociopolitical development; it 
was the “new” old source of legitimization. The sum total of these measures shows that 
laicist Turkey paradoxically has usurped more religious authority than the Sultans of the 
Ottoman Empire ever possessed. 
5.  The Era of Turgut Özal: New Dynamism and Self-Confidence 
for Islamic Interest Groups 
With the political turning point of 1980, the state assigned Islam an important role in the 
process of political and sociopolitical development. This new phase is exemplified espe-
cially in the person of the popular Prime Minister Turgut Özal. Özal was a politician with 
Kurdish ancestry who was rumored to be a member of the historical Naqshbandi order. 
Under his leadership, the newly founded Motherland Party (ANAP, Anavatan Partisi) 
won a surprisingly decisive victory in the parliamentary elections of fall 1983, attracting 45 
percent of the vote. Özal was Prime Minister from 1983 to 1989 and Turkey’s President 
from 1989 until his death in 1993. 
By fusing progress and pragmatism with a commitment to religion and tradition, Özal, 
a practicing Muslim, opened up new possibilities for the roles of Islam and the Ottoman 
heritage. Özal built new bridges between state, society, and religion. He introduced the 
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breaking of the daily fast (Turkish: Iftar) during Ramadan to his administration and was 
the first Turkish Prime Minister to embark on the pilgrimage to Mecca (1988) – he had 
himself filmed for maximum publicity in the ritual pilgrim’s robe while circumambulat-
ing the Kaaba. Also under Özal’s aegis, Adnan Menderes, who had been executed by the 
military government following the 1960 coup, was rehabilitated; today, many streets and 
public squares are named after him. 
The core of Özal’s administration was made up of prominent members of the 
Naqshbandi order. One of its first acts was the legalization of charitable donations to reli-
gious institutions. The administration also re-wrote the curriculum for elementary and 
secondary education under the impetus of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, placing heavier 
emphasis on national history and culture. In doing so, the word “milli” (“national”) was 
used synonymously for “Islamic”.38 
The Özal era was also characterized by a policy of opening markets. It led to a massive 
influx of capital, especially from the Arab region. This “green” or “Islamic” capital was 
invested primarily in the banking and tourism sectors. This new inflow of capital also 
enabled the Islamists to reorganize politically and be more economically active. The reli-
gious orders and brotherhoods (Turkish: Tarikat) – which symbolized the Anatolian 
Islam shaped by Sufism that had been banned under Atatürk – also received new free-
doms due to the state’s new-found tolerance: they were now allowed to officially finance 
the construction of private schools and universities, and they established social services for 
the feeding of the poor and handed out scholarships to students in schools and universi-
ties. Today, there are an estimated 130 orders with a total of about 10 million members in 
Turkey. The three largest are the Naqshbandi order and the Nurculuk and Süleymancı 
movements that came out of it in the first half of the 20th century.39 
Özal’s economic policy also turned away from the import substitutions of the 1960s 
and 1970s and led to an increased promotion of small and mid-sized companies. Espe-
cially the more provincial Anatolian cities such as Kayseri, Sivas and Gaziantep witnessed 
an upturn that had until then seemed inconceivable. A large number of companies 
emerged that were able to establish themselves on the world market as producers of, and 
suppliers for, export goods in the textile, leather, produce, construction and engineering 
industries. The upswing created a new middle class, the so-called “Anatolian bourgeoisie”, 
which is deeply grounded in Turkish Islamic culture. Although it is largely pro-de-
mocratic, it does advocate more religious freedom. The backbone of this new bourgeoisie 
– also referred to as the “Anatolian tigers” – is made up of Muslim academics, family 
businesses and small to medium-sized companies. They are a fast-growing class of entre-
preneurs who profess Islam without simultaneously negating Western values or the im-
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portance of a liberal economy. This group draws interesting parallels between Islam and 
the Protestant work ethic as well as Calvinism, claiming that these had played a crucial 
part not only in the Industrial Revolution but also in the rise of Europe and the United 
States to the status of economic world powers. According to this interpretation, religion is 
a motor for progress, i.e., the strengthening of Islamic identity can benefit the progress of 
the Turkish state and economy.40 
Despite the growing influence of “Islamic capital”, Muslim companies were initially 
unsuccessful in building close connections to the state apparatus. To redress this fact, the 
“Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association”, or MÜSIAD (Müstakil 
Sanayici ve Işadamları Derneği), was founded in 1990. The MÜSIAD sees itself as a plat-
form and interest group representing small and medium-sized Islamic businesses to state 
authorities. In everyday usage, the word “müstakil” (“independent”) in the MÜSIAD’s 
full title is often replaced by “müslüman” (“Muslim”), as Islam plays an important role in 
the business philosophy of the association and in its members’ business transactions as 
establishing trust and solidarity. 2,600 companies were members of the MÜSIAD in 2006, 
accounting for 12 percent of Turkey’s gross national product.41 The association’s biggest 
achievement is having turned Islam into a strategic resource for strengthening its own 
identity, promoting networking among members, and lobbying for its own interests with 
state authorities.42 
The Islamist movement got new impulses from a referendum held in September 1987. 
A narrow majority of the electorate voted in favor of revoking the ban on political activity 
for parties and politicians that had existed before the coup in 1980, including the former 
Prime Ministers Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit. However, Islamist leader Nec-
mettin Erbakan also returned to active politics. With the help of intermediaries, he had 
already founded the Islamist Welfare Party (RP, Refah Partisi) in 1983.  
The ANAP, now under competitive pressure as it had to contend with the full spec-
trum of parties, distanced itself from the IMF’s Structural Adjustment Program for rea-
sons of electoral expediency. The ANAP “purchased” its victorious 36 percent of the vote 
at the early parliamentary elections in November 1987 with populist pre-election 
promises such as an increase in wages and social benefits for the civil service as well as 
easier entry into the land registry. However, Özal’s abandonment of the IMF program led 
to a rise in inflation of around 70 percent in 1988 and 1989, which especially affected the 
low-income strata of the population.43 In the 1989 local elections, the ANAP only received 
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22 percent of the vote. Many voters had turned to Erbakan’s Welfare Party in protest. 
Özal relinquished his post in the same year and had himself elected President of Turkey. 
My analysis of the Özal era shows that the official revaluation of Islam as part of 
Turkish identity combined with liberal economic policies led to increased self-confidence 
and new momentum for Islamic interest groups. The development of the Muslim busi-
ness world and the “Anatolian bourgeoisie” is one of Özal’s main achievements. More-
over, thanks to Özal the state was no longer regarded as a mere collection of institutions, 
but as a promoter of a collective identity. As such, the state took on a role that it had not 
played since the days of the Ottoman Empire. 
6.  The Rise and Fall of the Islamist Welfare Party (RP) 
In the 1990s, Islamism in Turkey experienced an upswing that exceeded that of the 1970s. 
The impetus for this new (old) movement once again came from Necmettin Erbakan and 
had its source in the new self-confidence of religious groups that originated in the state’s 
revaluation of Islamic identity under the auspices of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and 
Özal’s policies, but also in support by the “Anatolian bourgeoisie”. The Anatolian bour-
geoisie had turned its back on the ANAP when Özal’s successor, the economically liberal 
Mesut Yilmaz, was said to have no flair for religious topics. This new self-confidence was 
bolstered further by anti-European resentments that followed the denial of Turkey’s 
membership application to the EC in 1989 and the EU’s hesitant stance in the Bosnian 
War.44 Militant Islamism had rapidly gained support as a global movement after the end of 
the Cold War and had reared its head at the beginning of the 1990s, e.g., in the rise of the 
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria, the armed conflict between the Muslim Brother-
hood and the Egyptian government, and in the Caucasus; in Turkey, however, it played 
only a secondary role.45 
Defining Factors for the Rise of the RP 
While the rhetoric practiced by Erbakan’s parties in the 1970s was more provincial in its 
outlook, the RP now struck a modern, intellectual chord. The most important element of 
the RP’s objectives was described by its slogan Adil Düzen, the “Just Order”. The term 
neither described an Islamic political order nor did it question Turkey’s republican 
founding principles. It did, however, criticize the manner in which the republic had been 
founded, which supposedly had been accompanied by “unjust” (i.e., unislamic) policies. 
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The RP thus launched an indirect attack on the Kemalist model of state, society, and 
economy, which it claimed had encouraged economic and social inequalities, corruption, 
and moral decline. The “Just Order”, the RP claimed, could create an “orderly” and “just” 
society by strengthening Islamic identity and moral values. In addition, it postulated a 
“Just Economic Order” as a “third way” between capitalism and socialism: the state was 
supposed to promote free entrepreneurship and at the same time build up its own heavy 
industry; the state’s social policy was supposed to benefit people with low incomes. In the 
long term, a common economic area was to be established between Turkey and Muslim 
countries, the so-called D-8 (eight developing countries: Turkey, Iran, Bangladesh, Egypt, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, and Pakistan), and act as a counterpart to the G7.46 
Turgut Özal’s unexpected death in 1993 had not only weakened the ANAP, but also 
created a vacuum in the conservative religious camp as well as worsened the economic 
situation. A huge budget deficit threw the Turkish economy into another serious eco-
nomic crisis in early 1994. The shortfall had been caused by the governing parties’ aban-
donment of the IMF’s Stabilization Program in the 1980s and the conflict between the 
Turkish state and the Kurdish PKK that had been intensifying since the beginning of the 
1990s. Annual economic growth fell by thirteen percentage points to -5.5 percent in 1994. 
Real wages for employees fell by 30 percent between 1990 and 1994, while inflation grew 
to more than 100 percent.47 
Several polls clearly showed the decline of confidence in the government of Prime 
Minister Tansu Çiller of the free-market conservative True Path Party (DYP, Doğru Yol 
Partisi). This displeasure was also reflected in the 1994 local elections, in which the RP was 
able to attract an astonishing 19.1 percent of the vote. Just one year later, it was also victo-
rious in the parliamentary elections, receiving 21.4 percent of the vote and becoming the 
strongest party with 158 of 550 parliamentary seats. It was not only Islamists, however, 
who had voted for Erbakan’s party. “The ‘hard core’ of Islamists who voted for the RP in 
1995 has been estimated at around 7 percent of the total electorate.”48 The RP was able to 
benefit from the following circumstances: 
– The Turkish-Kurdish conflict: The RP had promised in its party program to solve the 
“Kurdish problem” on the basis of “Muslim brotherliness”, to lift the state of emer-
gency, and to grant state aid to displaced persons for returning to their forcibly evacu-
ated villages. In the 1994 local elections, it received between 30 and 40 percent of the 
vote from voters with a Kurdish background, the highest among all parties – even 
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higher than that of the pro-Kurdish HADEP (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi), the political 
arm of the PKK.49 
– Support from female voters: Women were mobilized through a special women’s com-
mission that organized “tea afternoons” on topics such as “the dissolution of the tradi-
tional family structure” and “drug abuse”, and offered informal cooking and sewing 
classes open exclusively to women (with or without headscarf). The women’s com-
mission became a hallmark of and public relations success for the RP: the Islamist RP, 
of all parties, was the very first to discover the sociopolitical importance of women in 
electoral politics in a patriarchal society, and in doing so it had raised the self-esteem of 
many women. Moreover, the commission attracted around one million women to the 
RP over the course of six years.50 
– Support from the Gecekondular: In addition to the rapid population increase it was 
especially the war against the PKK that spurred the domestic migration of the 1980s. 
This in turn led to the growth of the cities and their slum-like suburbs, the Gecekon-
dular. Around 13 million people called them their home in the mid-1990s, 80 percent 
of whom could be considered part of a conservative religious population. Within this 
milieu, Islam is an important cognitive means of communication and of community-
building. In the 1990s, the RP was the only party to have built a social network in these 
areas. In addition to neighborly help, the RP also distributed relief goods, arranged 
jobs and gave out scholarships to school and college students:51 
 
 
 
Year Total Population Rural Population Urban Population 
1950 20,947,188 15,702,851 5,244,337 
1960 27,754,820 18,895,089 8,859,731 
1970 35,605,176 21,914,075 13,691,101 
1980 44,736,957 25,091,950 19,645,007 
1990 56,473,035 23,146,684 33,326,351 
2000 67,803,927 23,797,653 44,006,274 
        Source: Turkish Statistical Institute 
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Surveys show that the RP was able to establish its slogan “Just Order” well in the public 
conscience. Its voters spoke of social justice and of honesty in tackling problems. In the 
cities, such as in Istanbul and Ankara, where an RP member had been mayor since 1994, 
corruption had decreased – as promised during the electoral campaign; but more than 
that, the quality of municipal services, infrastructure, and environmental protection had 
improved. This bestowed a positive image on the RP. Only 16 percent of the RP’s voters 
regarded it as an Islamist organization. More than 70 percent said that the Welfare Party 
would introduce neither the Sharia nor an Islamic state.52 
The RP in Power: Turkey’s Transformation into an Islamic Republic? 
After the ANAP-DYP minority government foundered, Erbakan accepted Tansu Çiller’s 
offer to form a coalition government – even though his electoral campaign had called for 
“honesty” and “morality” and had doubted Çiller’s integrity, as she had been implicated 
in several corruption scandals. 
On June 28, 1996, the parliamentary majority of the new coalition elected Erbakan 
Prime Minister. This 54th government was a historic turning point, as for the first time in 
its history Turkey was ruled by an Islamist politician. The turning point was a predomi-
nantly psychological one, since it called into question Kemalist control of state resources. 
In the future, control of budget expenditures and audits, as well as the recruitment of new 
civil servants, would be in the hands of the Islamists. In order to refute his critics and to 
prevent possible intervention by the military, Erbakan emphasized in his inaugural speech 
that he would operate within the parameters of the democratic order and would respect 
Turkey’s laicist path. Previously, by contrast, he had praised the advantages of the Sharia 
at party congresses and had suggested that it also be introduced in Turkey. Erbakan’s later 
remarks were therefore denounced as Takkiye, or “Islamic deception”, by the Kemalist 
press and the opposition parties. 
The RP’s election victory increased the self-confidence of its religious core supporters 
and led to a politicization of religion. The difficult separation of private and public re-
ligion discussed earlier in this paper manifested itself especially in the issue of headscarves. 
Erbakan’s party turned this ordinary piece of clothing into a political symbol and or-
ganized demonstrations with imams sympathetic to its cause and with female students 
wearing headscarves.53 This period also witnessed an Islamization of the public sphere: 
alcoholic beverages were banned from state restaurants and cafeterias, several initiatives 
against prostitution were launched and “indecent” sculptures were removed from public 
places. These actions fueled the public discourse between Islamists and Kemalists and 
unleashed an ideological battle for the state-run Presidency for Religious Affairs. The 
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Kemalists accused the RP of filling the 6,000 open positions at the Diyanet with party 
members, thus attempting to bring about an Islamization “from above”.54 
Erbakan also wanted to use foreign policy to demonstrate that Turkey had become 
more Islamic. Erbakan’s first official guests were the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and 
his first state visits led him to Iran and Libya. It must be noted, however, that Erbakan, in 
his role as Prime Minister, respected Turkey’s international obligations – not least due to 
pressure from his coalition partner, the DYP. Accordingly, he kept the terms of the cus-
toms union into which Turkey had entered with the EU in 1996, despite the fact that he 
had rejected it during the electoral campaign as financially disadvantageous.55 In the same 
vein, he continued the logistical support for the U.S. military bases in Turkey as well as 
the strategic cooperation with Israel. He was unable, however, to realize his vision of an 
Islamic economic community, the D-8. 
The Political Decline of the RP 
The RP’s political decline began just a few months after its ascent to power in the summer 
of 1996. The Welfare Party had attracted accusations of bigotry when it repeatedly used its 
parliamentary majority to block committees from investigating the accusations of cor-
ruption against Tansu Çiller. Moreover, Erbakan was criticized from within his own party, 
as he had failed to translate many of his promises into action: neither the alignment of 
official working hours with religious rules, nor a liberalization of the ban on headscarves 
had been realized. In order to placate the ultra-religious wing of his party, Erbakan pre-
sented a bill that would allow headscarves to be worn in enclosed public places and open 
the officer career to religious soldiers. This bill, however, did not go far enough for his 
party’s radical wing, which demanded at a party event in Sincan (near Ankara) on January 
31, 1997, the introduction of the Sharia in Turkey and called the “Iranian Revolution” a 
model for Turkey. 
In response, the military began a public campaign, the “secular front”. This anti-
Islamist extra-parliamentary opposition organized weekly demonstrations in the cities 
and enjoyed the support of three important actors: the large-business association 
TÜSIAD, which was afraid that a negative image of Turkey could trigger a collapse of 
Turkey’s exports; the Turkish President, who warned against an unconstitutional “ex-
ploitation of religion”; and civil society, including parts of the media, unions and 
women’s organizations. Alevi organizations, too, participated in the demonstrations. 
There had been attacks by radical Sunnis on Alevis in the eastern Anatolian city of Sivas as 
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well as in Istanbul in 1993 and 1995. The Alevis held the RP responsible for the deterio-
rating atmosphere between them and the Sunnis.56 
On February 28, 1997, the military’s General Staff presented a memorandum that 
called Islamism the greatest threat to the laicist order, democracy, and domestic security. 
In an 18-point catalogue, the military leadership demanded among other things:57 
– the closure of any Koran schools not under state control; 
– a civil service hiring freeze for members of the Welfare Party; 
– closer monitoring of financial institutions belonging to religious orders, brotherhoods, 
and organizations; 
– the passing of binding limits on the wearing of religious attire in public institutions, 
especially universities – enforcement of the ban on headscarves had up to this point 
been at the universities’ discretion. 
Erbakan signed the “Resolutions of February 28”, accompanied by vast but overall 
peaceful protests by supporters of the Welfare Party. The military, however, forced 
Erbakan’s resignation by informing the public about militant groups that allegedly were 
closely associated with the RP and were planning terrorist attacks. The military threatened 
to take action against these organizations “by force of arms” unless Erbakan were either to 
intervene himself or to submit his resignation. After an increasing number of deputies 
from the junior coalition partner DYP resigned from their own party, thus withdrawing 
the coalition’s parliamentary majority, Erbakan and his government resigned after just 
one year in office on June 30, 1997. 
In January 1998, the RP was banned by the Turkish constitutional court for “contempt 
of the constitutional rule of separation of state and religion”; prior to this act, the Virtue 
Party (FP, Fazilet Partisi) had been founded as a political repository for former RP mem-
bers. The RP’s party assets were confiscated, and Erbakan and other party officials were 
banned from political activity for five years. Erbakan sued Turkey before the European 
Court of Human Rights. The court, however, ruled that the bans were legal, as they served 
the overriding need of protecting state and society. According to the court, the RP politi-
cians had not clearly distanced themselves from the violence and had repeatedly de-
manded the introduction of the Sharia, a violation of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights to which Turkey is also a signatory.58  
The RP’s political failure and its ban weakened the Islamist movement. In the parlia-
mentary elections of April 1999, the FP only took third place, winning 15.4 percent of the 
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vote, and joined the opposition. In June 2001 the FP, too, was banned on the grounds that 
it was a reconstituted RP. 
My analysis of the Erbakan era shows that the RP’s rule did not lead to a transfor-
mation of Turkey back into an Islamic state. The party moved – due to pressure from its 
coalition partner and the narrow framework allowed by the military – within the 
democratic parameters of Turkey. The era, however, did witness an Islamization of the 
public sphere and a politicization of religion, which led to heightened tensions in the do-
mestic political climate. The RP’s failure was not only caused by the military’s prolonged 
tactic of attrition and the pressure of the “secular front”, but was primarily political and 
self-inflicted. It neither succeeded in improving Turkey’s economic situation nor in intro-
ducing a “Just Order”, which remained an empty phrase. The exposure of contacts 
between parts of the RP and militant groups scared off the “Anatolian bourgeoisie” and its 
companies: they distanced themselves from the RP, which weakened the Islamist move-
ment both politically and financially. 
 
7.  Post-Islamists or Islamists? Objectives and Actions of the  
Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
The era of the Islamist movement, which had always been closely linked to the name 
Erbakan, ended with the banning of the Virtue Party in the summer of 2001. This fresh 
party ban acted as a catalyst and for the first time caused a split in the Islamist movement, 
marginalizing it even further. The split had been preceded by a remarkably self-critical 
discourse about future objectives – it initiated a change in the way of thinking and in 
ideology among the Islamists. The reform wing had criticized Erbakan’s authoritarian 
leadership style, as well as the Welfare Party’s failures in government, and the Islamist 
rhetoric that they claimed to have provoked the ban. The RP, they alleged, had not just 
failed because of the military, but also because of its closed and antiquated vision of so-
ciety.59 The camps of Erbakan-followers and traditionalists combined to form the Felicity 
Party (SP, Saadet Partisi), whereas the reformers founded the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi). 48 of the FP’s former deputies joined the SP, 53 
the AKP. Erbakan’s right-hand man Recai Kutan became chairman of the SP. The AKP’s 
leader was Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who had made a name for himself in the 1990s as the 
successful mayor of Istanbul. 
The ideological change is evident in the AKP’s party program – it is completely in line 
with Turkey’s republican rules. The AKP respects the principles of democracy and laicism. 
Laicism, however, is not interpreted as a form of state control, but instead as the state’s 
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neutrality vis-à-vis all religions. There are no longer any demands for the introduction of 
a “Just Order”. With regard to economic policy, there is no longer a call for a state-con-
trolled heavy industry – unlike under Erbakan’s leadership. Instead, the party advocates 
free entrepreneurship and a market economy that also takes into account the interests of 
the middle class. The most important issue in the party program – and simultaneously the 
largest difference from Erbakan’s RP – is the clear endorsement of the Western commu-
nity. Turkey’s accession to the European Union (EU) is mentioned as a priority, and 
NATO and the United States are called its most important partners after the EU. The 
Islamic world only plays a subordinate role.60 
Defining Factors of the AKP’s Electoral Success 
In the early parliamentary elections of November 2002, the AKP won a stunning 34.3 
percent of the vote. The second of two parties to win seats in the Turkish parliament was 
the republican CHP with 19.4 percent of the vote. Due to the ten-percent electoral 
threshold, the AKP received 363 out of the 550 seats with just a third of the electoral vote, 
barely missing a two-thirds majority. The SP, by contrast, only received 2.5 percent of the 
vote, making Erbakan the big loser of this election. He had been stigmatized as a failure 
ever since his political collapse. 
The rise of the AKP, however, was not only due to its new objectives but must also be 
considered in the context of the largest economic and financial crisis in the history of 
Turkey, which rocked the country in the spring of 2001 when both the state and the 
economy were still dealing with the consequences of the earthquake that had struck Istan-
bul in 1999. The crisis was triggered by a report on the Turkish banking system presented 
by the IMF in late 2000, which pointed out severe problems. The national banks alone had 
amassed uncovered liabilities in the amount of 20 billion USD. Around the same time, the 
media had revealed corruption, nepotism, and bribes between banks and members of 
major political parties.61  
Ecevit’s administration, whose left-of-center DSP (Demokrat Sol Partisi) had been 
governing in a three-party coalition with the nationalist MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi) 
and the ANAP, was unable to solve the problems and meet the demands of the IMF. This 
led Turkey to the brink of collapse: economic growth plummeted by fifteen percentage 
points compared to the previous year and was at -7.5 percent in 2001; the Turkish Lira 
lost 113 percent of its value against the U.S. Dollar; real income for employees fell by 20 
percent; the statutory monthly minimum wage fell from 156 to 100 USD; 50,000 retail 
and small businesses had to file for bankruptcy; unemployment rose by 1.5 million people 
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in the month of February 2001. Between 2000 and 2002 the unemployment rate rose by 
four percentage points to 10.3 percent. The situation was so dire that the military’s 
General Staff felt the need to point out the danger of looming social upheaval:62 
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My analyses in this paper show that the outcome of the 2002 elections was primarily the 
result of voters casting their ballots in protest of the dire economic problems and the 
quarrels within the government. The combined share of the coalition parties DSP, ANAP, 
and MHP fell from 53.4 percent of the vote (1999) to 14.6 percent. A full third of the 
electorate wanted to vote for a new party. Out of this group, 38 percent cast their ballot 
for the AKP. The AKP was also able to attract significant support from voters who either 
voted for the first time or were less than 30 years old. Moreover, the AKP was popular 
with the residents of the Gecekondular who were particularly badly hit by the economic 
crisis. As expected, support was also strong among the “Anatolian bourgeoisie”, the 
MÜSIAD, and in Kurdish areas.63 
Successes in EU and Economic Policy 
In his first public speech as Prime Minister, Erdoğan presented himself as a “reformed” 
Islamist, quoting Atatürk multiple times. Critics accused him – as they had done with 
Erbakan – of Takkiye, i.e., the obscurement of his faith through deception. Erdoğan was 
confronted with some of his previous statements. In a speech in 1998, he had quoted a 
poem by Ziya Gökalp, the “father of Turkish nationalism”, which says among other things 
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that “the mosques are our barracks, the domes are our helmets, the minarets our bayo-
nets, and the faithful our soldiers”. Even though this quote can be found in almost any 
history schoolbook, Erdoğan was sentenced to a ten-month term of imprisonment in 
September 1998 for “crimes against the state”, four of which he spent in jail. On the way 
to jail, Erdoğan had himself be celebrated like a martyr by thousands of supporters. In jail 
he then styled himself – without a hint of irony – as the “Nelson Mandela of Turkey”. 
When taking over the government’s business, the AKP presented itself – in contrast to 
the RP – as a new force for reform and, thanks to its absolute parliamentary majority, was 
able to act assertively. During the period from December 2002 to March 2003 alone, the 
AKP was able to push through more than 54 constitutional and statutory amendments in 
the course of preparing for EU accession, thus putting an end – at least statutorily – 
among other things to the long-standing discrimination against the Kurdish and Christian 
minorities as well as against marginalized groups like disabled or homosexual persons – 
normally a taboo in Muslim societies. The AKP was able to pass additional reform pack-
ages and to achieve the beginning of EU accession negotiations on October 3, 2005.64 
In addition to the reforms required by the EU, Turkey’s commitments to its allies were 
cause for discussion. While the AKP government continues the deployment of Turkish 
troops as part of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, it came into open conflict with the 
United States in the run-up to the current Iraq War. 71 AKP deputies (together with the 
CHP opposition party) had voted against their own government in early March 2003, 
refusing to grant U.S. troops the right to launch attacks from Turkish soil. After fierce 
criticism by the United States, a partial settlement was achieved: Turkey granted the 
United States overflight rights for Turkish airspace, but denied the American request to 
use U.S. military bases in Turkey for air raids. 
This cooperation, however, had severe repercussions for Turkey: on November 15 and 
20, 2003, Istanbul became the target of Islamist terror attacks. Four suicide bombers deto-
nated explosives outside two synagogues, the British consulate, and a British bank. The 
attacks claimed 62 lives and left 500 injured. All parties, including the SP of Islamist poli-
tician Erbakan, condemned the attacks, which were the work of Kurdish Turks who were 
members of the terrorist organization “Great Eastern Islamic Raiders’ Front” (IBDA-C, 
Islami Büyük Doğu Akıncılar–Cephesi) and raised the possibility of organized structures 
of militant Islamists and their illegal networks. According to information from the 
Turkish domestic intelligence agency, Islamists are estimated to make up – as mentioned 
previously – 10 percent of the Turkish population, with 1-3 percent being sympathetic to 
militant groups.65 
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In addition to the results yielded by the investigation of the terror attacks and to a 
strict democratic course, the AKP’s political image also benefited from its successful 
economic policy. The Erdoğan government has been consistent in implementing the IMF 
stabilization program, which calls for the privatization of the banking and energy sectors, 
the reform of the welfare and tax systems, and greater access for foreign investors. The 
AKP government was able to achieve rapid economic growth and to more than double the 
average annual per-capita income from approx. 2,100 USD (2001) to approx. 5,100 USD 
(2005). Its course of consolidation allowed inflation to sink below 10 percent in 2004, the 
first time in more than 30 years.66 
The AKP: Politicizing Religion? 
Emboldened by its successes in EU and economic policy, the AKP has developed new self-
confidence. Since 2004, it has increasingly lent support to the interests of its religious 
constituency and has articulated more overtly religious moral standards. In doing so, it 
has also run into trouble in trying to separate private and public religious spheres. For 
example, just like the RP before it, the AKP gradually banned alcoholic beverages from the 
cafeterias of ministries and state agencies. Municipal governments controlled by the AKP 
restricted the consumption of alcohol in public places, providing the interesting reason 
that this was not done to adhere to the prescriptions of the Sharia, but rather – like in the 
United States – for the protection of the citizens’ health and the reduction in public health 
expenses that would result from it. Moreover, AKP politicians have repeatedly made 
headlines for wanting to divide public parks and beaches into men’s and women’s areas 
according to Islamic criteria, or to introduce separate women-only days for public swim-
ming pools – arguing that the latter are offered even in Christian Europe. Conversely, 
Kemalists have criticized the Islamization of the public sphere and polemicized, e.g., 
against the criminalization of alcohol consumption and against women in full-body 
bathing suits, barring their access to public beaches in some places. 
The reason for analyzing the extent to which the AKP also politicizes Islam is to answer 
the basic question of how much visible religion a laicist constitutional state may accept 
and how much religious freedom a democracy must allow. It also raises the question of 
how sensible the Kemalist definition of laicism is. The following issues are at the center of 
this discourse:  
1. the liberalization of the headscarf ban in public places; 
2. the enhancement in status of the employees of the state agency for religion and its 
reform for greater autonomy; 
3. the rights of the Alevis. 
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Turkey is the only country with a majority Muslim population that has instituted a 
general ban on headscarves in enclosed public places, e.g., public schools, universities, 
hospitals and state buildings – even including ministries and the Turkish parliament. This 
rigid ban has produced bizarre results: for example, the wives of Prime Minster Erdoğan, 
Foreign Minister Gül, and of other AKP ministers may not attend receptions held by the 
President or ones honoring foreign dignitaries, since many of them wear headscarves. On 
the other hand, the wives accompany politicians on their trips to foreign countries, where 
the headscarf is tolerated. In everyday life, the absurdity of this policy is reflected in the 
fact that many female Muslims studying or working in public institutions paradoxically 
cover up their headscarves with wigs. 
Two fundamentally different views collide in the headscarf debate. The AKP argues 
that every woman should have the right to dress as she likes. The wearing of the headscarf 
is defended as a “basic right”. The Kemalist side points to Article 24 of the Turkish con-
stitution, which says “Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religious belief and 
conviction. […] No one shall be compelled to worship, or to participate in religious 
ceremonies and rites, to reveal religious beliefs and convictions, or be blamed or accused 
because of his religious beliefs and convictions.” For Kemalists, this means above all that 
individuals have not only the right of religious freedom, but also a right to be free from 
religion. This is designed to protect the individual from a social dictatorship of the reli-
gious (e.g., protect people who do not fast during Ramadan but do not want to admit this 
for fear of defamation). 
Three quarters of all Turks – including many Kemalists – advocate permitting female 
students to wear headscarves. Nevertheless, the Turkish constitutional court, the Council 
of State, upheld the headscarf ban in 2004. In the court’s view, the headscarf is a political 
symbol and no longer a mere expression of the freedom to choose one’s dress. The Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights upheld this ruling in November 2005. The Turkish Council 
of State made it clear that parties that advocate the wearing of headscarves in enclosed 
public places are liable to prosecution. This was understood as a warning to Erdoğan not 
to politicize the headscarf issue and risk a party ban. The AKP accepted the decision and 
passed a “headscarf amnesty” in February 2005. This allowed around 230,000 female stu-
dents to continue their studies, albeit without headscarves.67  
The headscarf debate was re-ignited in the spring of 2006 after a lawyer forced his way 
into the Council of State, shooting and killing one judge and injuring six more. A few 
weeks earlier, the court had barred a female school principal from wearing the headscarf 
even outside school property. It argued that teachers, especially, were role models and 
bound to uphold the laicist principles of the state. Their function as role models, the 
judges held, did not end with their work day. For that reason, the principal has to take off 
her headscarf already on the way to work. This ruling extended the definition of the 
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headscarf ban – which prior to then had only applied to enclosed public places – to open 
public places, i.e., streets and public squares, creating an absurd precedent that should 
serve to further politicize religion.68 
As in the days of the RP government, an ideological battle about the Diyanet has 
erupted between the Kemalists and the AKP. Since early 2000, around 17,000 state-run 
mosques have been lacking imams. Turkey’s President repeatedly refused to approve an 
order to hire new imams, arguing that the AKP was only trying to place its sympathizers 
in the Diyanet in order to “Islamicize state and society from above”.69 Similarly, the AKP’s 
plans for reforming the Diyanet – according to which it was no longer supposed to be 
under the control of the Prime Minister, but be self-governing – met with resistance from 
the Turkish President and the opposition CHP. The CHP argues that an autonomous 
Presidency for Religious Affairs that is no longer integrated into the governmental struc-
tures would gradually spell the end of the state’s monopoly on controlling religion. More-
over, the CHP claims, the Diyanet could be more easily subverted by radical Islamists who 
could then agitate against the laicist state.70 
The Alevis have also entered the debate about the Diyanet. They continue to be treated 
as a cultural minority and demand to be recognized as a religious community. The Alevis 
asked the Diyanet also to recognize differing forms of Islam. To this date, their places of 
worship – just like those of the Christian communities – only exist as private foundations 
and are not supported by the Turkish state. In line with its share of the population, the 
Alevis demand 15-20 percent of the Diyanet’s jobs and of its financial support. The AKP 
rejects this demand, as it does the idea of reforming the compulsory religious education 
classes in the schools, which up until now are tailored exclusively to Sunni Islam. The 
Alevis demand that in the future, classes should also include their faith or that their 
children should have the same right of exemption from religious instruction that was 
granted to Christian students following international protests in 1991. In order to exert 
pressure on the AKP, Alevi organizations sued Turkey in the European Court of Human 
Rights in Strasbourg in the summer of 2006. 
My analysis shows that in its resounding victory in the 2002 parliamentary elections 
the AKP not only benefited from the worst economic crisis in Turkish history, but that 
the victory was also based on a remarkable ideological change. Stephen Kinzer has called 
the AKP’s transformation and programmatic change “the most astonishing political 
revolution in the Middle East”.71 This change has been commented on and influenced by 
many intellectuals through the media ever since the ban of the Welfare Party. For Ali 
Bulaç, one of the most influential Islamic authors in Turkey, the project of an Islamic state 
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is dead. He is critical of Iran, which had been seen as a model by some parts of the RP. 
Bulaç argues that Iran, with its ideological model of state and society, has lost its appeal 
for other Muslim countries and is globally isolated. Moreover he asserts that the seculari-
zation of Islam from within has already passed the point of no return, and that democracy 
is also accepted among Islamists – as illustrated by the revocation of the party ban in the 
case of the RP through the judicial system (rather than through acts of violence).72  
Another reason why Turkish Islamism has not descended into terrorism is not only the 
endogenous context from which it emerged and its integration into the democratic pro-
cess but, as M. Hakan Yavuz points out, possibly also the strong Sufi character of Turkish 
Islam. Compared to Arab-orthodox or Iranian Shiite Islam, Turkish Islam is less literalist, 
thus making it less vulnerable to political indoctrination and radicalization. This is evi-
denced by countries where Turkish Islam is dominant, e.g., in the Balkans and in the 
Turkic countries of central Asia. There, the post-Cold War transformation largely took 
place peacefully and with the involvement of religious groups in the political process, and 
without any calls for the establishment of an Islamic state modeled on Iran.73 
For Muslim intellectuals such as Ömer Çelik and Ahmet Küskün, both of whom also 
advise the AKP, Islamism holds the same dangers as nationalism. They are critical of the 
nation-state’s attempts at forcing the diversity found in its society into the straightjacket 
of a religiously and culturally uniform nation. In their opinion, such restriction results in 
some groups being privileged while others are marginalized. Similar processes of ho-
mogenization and authoritarian policies could also occur in an Islamic state: “Where the 
necessity to live together with others is abolished, the others are abolished. A model that 
fashions a society based on Islamic principles may result in oppression and cruelty, not 
only for others but also for Muslims.” This, they declared, was unislamic.74 
Defining factors for this ideological change are above all the strength of and resistance 
by secular groups in Turkey – not just inside the state apparatus, but especially in society. 
This development has been influenced by the moderating effect of the “Anatolian bour-
geoisie” – which wants to expand the state’s edict of toleration vis-à-vis religion, but 
within the parameters of the basic democratic order – and the growing export dependency 
of the Turkish economy (including Muslim entrepreneurs) on Western countries. The 
necessity for larger support from civil society and the (desired) acquisition of new sections 
of the middle-class electorate, i.e., outside of the traditional core of Muslim supporters, 
have prompted a learning process among the political leadership. As a result, the AKP 
program no longer calls for a “Just Order” or for Turkey’s integration into the Islamic 
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world – this would be political suicide. Moreover, the party leadership has recognized that 
a lasting public confrontation with the Turkish military – for many Turks still the most 
trusted institution in the country – would find no popular support. In contrast to the 
Welfare Party, the AKP has adopted a positive stance vis-à-vis the West. Its clear en-
dorsement of a strong relationship with the United States, NATO, and the EU has made 
the party palatable also to non-Muslim voters.75 
My analysis shows moreover that there are also parts of the AKP that pursue policies 
that are strongly informed by a religious moral code. This is particularly evident in their 
struggle with the Kemalists for dominance in the public sphere, e.g., the religious moral 
standards, such as the stigmatization of alcohol consumption and the separation of public 
parks and beaches by sex, which the AKP contends do not mean – contrary to the fre-
quent assertions of the Kemalist press and state elite – the introduction of the Sharia 
“through the back door”. Such rules may exist in Islamic countries, but because Turkey – 
as mentioned earlier – is constitutionally not an Islamic state, the ban on alcohol and the 
separation of sexes in public places constitutes discrimination against non-Muslim and 
non-religious parts of the population, as they limit personal freedom. Conversely, the 
Kemalists’ criticism of women who wear headscarves or full-body bathing suits is exces-
sive. Although it may perhaps offend individual esthetic sensibilities, it certainly does not 
limit the personal, individual freedom of non-Muslims. The Kemalist side therefore must 
ask itself to what extent it is prepared to afford the same tolerance to Muslims that it de-
mands from them. 
Under the AKP government, the situation of the Alevis with regard to the practicing of 
their faith has improved, thanks to the EU’s reform policies. Places of worship have 
tripled in number since the 1970s to 900 in 2006.76 However, despite its criticism of the 
homogenizing efforts of the nation-state, the AKP has not legally recognized the Alevis as 
a religious community and has refused to overhaul religious instruction in the schools. 
This suggests that it is doing so for populist reasons, not wanting to alienate the ultra-
religious wing of its Sunni core supporters, and is hoping for votes from right-wing 
nationalist parts of the electorate in the 2007 parliamentary elections. 
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8.  Conclusions 
The Turkish model of laicism is discriminatory and undemocratic. It is a pivotal pillar of 
the Kemalist educational dictatorship, which was heavily influenced by the authoritarian 
political ideologies of early 20th-century Europe. At the same time, their interpretation of 
laicism reflects the Kemalists’ greatest fear, namely the social and territorial fragmentation 
of Turkey along religious and ethnic lines. To prevent this, the Kemalist state politicizes 
Islam “from above” – with the actual goal of secularizing the entire Turkish society by 
propagating a republican, laicist state Islam. But since the ideological re-interpretation of 
Kemalism under the influence of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (TIS), the Presidency for 
Religious Affairs no longer has the “sole” task of propagating a pro-laicist version of 
Islam, but also that of contributing to “national solidarity and integration”. This re-politi-
cization of religion by the Kemalist state is aimed at homogenizing society: through the 
nationalization of Islam and the Islamization or “Sunnification” of the nation, Turkey’s 
Alevi and Kurdish identity is supposed to be further marginalized, thus ensuring the 
country’s social and territorial unity. 
The Kemalist definition of laicism has unintended consequences: it facilitates the 
politicization of Islam “from below”, i.e., by parties and social groups. Their objective is to 
weaken the Kemalist monopoly on the interpretation of religion, to exploit anti-Western 
sentiment, to win electoral votes from the Kurdish population, and especially to end the 
restrictions on religious freedom. The ban on wearing headscarves in enclosed public 
places, for example, has the effect of limiting the religious freedom not only of civil ser-
vants, who are duty bound to uphold the republican ideals, but also that of (non-political) 
private individuals such as physicians and students. The Turkish state should also have an 
interest in making the state’s educational institutions accessible to all parts of the popula-
tion. If the Kemalist logic dictates that the state offer Koran classes in order to prevent the 
use of illegal, non-state (and perhaps anti-Kemalist) classes, it should also have an interest 
in integrating those people into the state educational institutions. The headscarf ban plays 
into the hands of exactly those circles that are not interested in making state education 
accessible to women.77 
Secularism has been accepted as the normative model of the modern constitutional 
state. The subordination of religion to politics is a fundamental part of a functioning de-
mocracy. The European examples of Germany, the Netherlands and Great Britain have 
shown, however, that democracies need not be neutral in their philosophy, i.e., a strict 
institutional separation of state and religion is not a prerequisite for a functioning de-
mocracy. A democratic constitutional state committed to human rights must ensure, by 
contrast, that it does not discriminate against any religion or ethnic minority. Exactly this, 
however, is the case with the authoritarian Kemalist model of laicism. As a result, the 
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Turkish understanding of laicism is problematic and it can hardly be reconciled with the 
democratic theorem of the 21st century. The extent to which it can serve as a model for 
other Muslim countries is therefore – as indicated at the beginning of this paper – limited. 
The European Union is the greatest promoter of democracy in Turkey and for that 
reason must insist that Turkey end the discrimination against the Alevi and Kurdish 
populations, using the accession negotiations as political leverage to affect this process. 
This may result in the Kemalist state having to add to its two sources of legitimacy, Sunni 
Islam and Turkishness, and to bring them in line with today’s political realities. 
My analyses have revealed that Turkey is not threatened by an “Islamist peril”. State, 
politics, and society are for the most part secularized. Moreover the Turkish Islamic 
movement constituted itself not as a “revolutionary militant underground movement”, 
but emerged from a democratic, parliamentarian environment. Since the 1980s there has 
not only been an expansion of state services for Sunni Islam (such as the expansion of 
Koran classes and the construction of new mosques) but also one of the Kemalist edict of 
toleration vis-à-vis religious groups not sponsored by the state, i.e., the Islamic orders, 
brotherhoods, and religious organizations. These have used their new freedoms to be-
come economically, socially, and politically active and have played a major part in making 
Islam more publicly visible. 
The Welfare Party came into government as the result of a development that unfolded 
over the course of many years. This development is attributable to endogenous factors 
and would have been inconceivable without the ideological change at the highest level of 
the state under the influence of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. It also has also become 
clear that an Islamist Prime Minister is not synonymous with the introduction of an 
Islamic state. Due to the narrow constitutional framework in which Islamist parties can 
operate in Turkey, the power of secular social groups and the country’s longstanding inte-
gration into the Western community of states (NATO, EU), Turkey has built obligations 
that even Erbakan’s RP could not ignore. The “Process of February 28” led to a split in 
Necmettin Erbakan’s movement and triggered ideological change in Turkish Islamism 
that has deepened its integration into democracy. The reform-oriented wing of this 
movement succeeded in freeing itself from the RP’s ideology and in ushering in a post-
Islamist phase that became institutionalized in the religious-conservative AKP.  
The AKP can be classified as a hybrid political group that represents a unique synthesis 
of reformism and conservatism that crosses class boundaries. Its victory in the parlia-
mentary elections of November 2002 was not just a result of this ideological change but 
must also be viewed – just as in the case of the RP – in the light of the country’s socio-
economic problems. The AKP’s victory was facilitated significantly by the ten-percent 
electoral threshold, giving Erdoğan’s party an almost two-thirds majority in parliament 
with just one third of the popular vote. The threshold had been introduced by the military 
government in 1983 in order to keep communist, Kurdish, and Islamist parties out of 
parliament. However, the targeted exclusion of certain social groups from the political 
process not only weakens the democratic legitimacy of the state, but it can also be coun-
terproductive – as illustrated by the AKP’s victory – by allowing non-Kemalist forces to 
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become disproportionately strong. Here, too, the EU should exert its influence and push 
Turkey to lower the ten-percent threshold. 
After the fall of the RP, the military’s toleration of the AKP election victory represents 
an important milestone in the Turkish process of democratization. Prime Minister 
Erdoğan has gone through a learning process and has learned from Erbakan’s mistakes. 
He has realized that it is not a deeper integration of Turkey into the Islamic world but 
rather its grounding in the Western community of states that strengthens the AKP’s 
democratic legitimacy while simultaneously promoting the de-legitimization of the 
Kemalist establishment. Through its course of democratization, the AKP has been able to 
achieve not only accession negotiations with the EU but also the support of the United 
States. The Bush administration went as far as hailing the AKP’s transformation as a 
model for Islamist parties in the Middle East.78 
The AKP’s plans to hire new imams and to de-nationalize the Presidency for Religious 
Affairs illustrate – just like the ten-percent threshold – another structural problem in the 
Kemalist system, namely the fear that its own prerogative over the state’s resources may be 
broken and turned against the Kemalist state elite. It is especially the Kemalist allegation 
that the RP and the AKP have subverted the Diyanet with Islamists that shows that this 
agency is subject to permanent exploitation by the governing parties – no matter of which 
persuasion. Just like it offers the Kemalist pro-laicists a forum for politicizing faith and for 
spreading their ideology, Islamists can in principle also abuse it for the dissemination of 
anti-democratic ideas. 
As a result, the aforementioned claim by the Turkish military’s Chief of Staff that the 
AKP’s Islamization of the state and its politicization of Islam represent the greatest danger 
to Turkey’s republican laicist order does not bear out.79 The 2006 TESEV poll confirms 
this: 77 percent of those interviewed regarded democracy as the best form of government, 
while only 9 percent wanted to see Turkey turn into an Islamic state. In answering the 
question of whether laicism was in peril, 73 percent of respondents answered no. Should 
the military protect the laicist order? Only 24 percent supported this; 54 percent thought 
that it can also be protected by democratic means.80 
This raises the question of whether the criticism of the AKP’s policies of democratiza-
tion is less a response to an “Islamist peril” and more to the military’s fear that the EU 
accession negotiations could be used as political leverage in curtailing its ability to act 
autonomously and as superordinate to the institutions of government in favor of the pri-
macy of popular sovereignty.  
 
 
78  Cf. “US praises AKP role in Turkey’s democratization”, Turkish Daily News, November 11, 2005. 
79  Sultan Tepe comes to the same conclusion in Turkey’s AKP. A Model Muslim-Democratic Party?, in: 
Journal of Democracy, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2005, pp. 69-82. 
80  Cf. TESEV survey on religion, society, and politics (footnote 16). 
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Moreover, the military’s criticism reflects the worry that an AKP candidate could win 
the 2007 presidential elections. The Turkish President has to be politically neutral and is 
elected by parliament; until now he has always acted as the “Kemalist conscience and cor-
rective” in Turkish politics. In the military’s opinion, however, a President with close ties 
to the AKP would not be able to fulfill his role as a “democratic monitor” of the Turkish 
government and would approve of the AKP’s “Islamist politics”. For this reason, the 
military leadership threatened a coup in a memorandum at the end of April 2007 if AKP 
politician and Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül did not abandon his presidential aspira-
tions, triggering a political crisis. 
Due to the absences of the opposition CHP and of some other non-AKP deputies, the 
parliament had no quorum to elect Gül as President in May 2007, according to a remark-
able decision by the Council of State, the Turkish constitutional court. The court held that 
two thirds of the deputies, i.e., 367 of 550, must be present for presidential elections. The 
decision is all the more surprising if compared to the election of Turgut Özal to the office 
of President in 1989, when many deputies had also walked out, leaving the parliament 
with less than two thirds of its members. Özal was nevertheless elected President on the 
third ballot by simple majority. Despite this precedent, and to avoid further exacerbating 
the crisis, Gül withdrew his candidacy. 
My analyses lead to the conclusion that the AKP’s policies on the whole are oriented 
toward the fundamental principles of democracy and the rule of law, despite its occasional 
Islamist rhetoric. This represents an important milestone in the ongoing democratization 
of the pro-Islamic political movement. 
Nevertheless, in the context of the dispute surrounding the presidential elections, the 
Kemalist state elite has once again spelled out more concretely the terms under which 
parties with an Islamist past are permitted to operate. An AKP Prime Minister is accept-
able, as evidenced by the toleration of the AKP’s victory of the 2002 parliamentary elec-
tions and its five-year term in government. A politician closely affiliated with the AKP is, 
however, unacceptable for the highest political office in the Turkish Republic. It will be 
interesting to see how the Kemalist elite will react if the AKP were once again to emerge as 
the strongest political force from the early parliamentary elections on July 22, 2007 as well 
as in later elections and use this democratic mandate to not only assume the responsibili-
ties of government but also to exercise its prerogative to nominate a candidate for the 
office of President. 
The current way of electing the President illustrates a further structural problem of the 
Kemalist political system: a party with just one third of the electoral votes can receive al-
most two thirds of the seats in parliament. Such a party is thus not only able to form the 
government but also to nominate, and possibly elect, a candidate for President. This 
system may be democratic under the letter of the law, but it is not representative. Turkey 
should therefore reform the way in which the President is elected. One alternative would 
be to elect the President by popular ballot. This would not only ensure that the state’s 
highest office could no longer be used for partisan political gain but would also strengthen 
the President’s democratic legitimacy. 
Turkey: Islam and Laicism 41
 
 
Appendix: Table: Matrix of Sunni Islam in Turkey 
Of Turkey’s population of 70 million people, around 55 million belong to Sunni and 12-15 
million to Alevi Islam. Sunni Islam can be divided into the following categories: 
 
 State Islam Popular Islam Islamism 
 
Objectives 
 
Modernization of state and 
society; preservation of the 
republican laicist order and of 
territorial integrity 
 
Preservation of the faith and of 
Islamic identity 
 
Introduction of an “Islamic 
state” that subjugates politics, 
economy and society to the 
norms of the Koran and the 
Sharia 
 
Source of 
Legitimacy 
 
 
Scriptures (Koran), supple-
mented by Kemalist ideology 
(especially nationalism) 
 
Scriptures (Koran), supple-
mented by Anatolian customs 
and popular culture 
 
Scriptures (Koran) 
 
Dogma 
 
Positivism/Rationalism 
 
Mysticism/Sufism 
 
 
Orthodoxy/Fundamentalism  
(in the sense of strict 
adherence to the Scriptures) 
 
Desired  
Image 
 
Modern/Progressive 
 
 
Public-spirited/Integrating 
(in the sense of a supra-ethnic 
Islamic society) 
 
Truthful/Just 
 
Relationship 
to Laicism 
 
 
Affirmative 
 
Depending on the group either 
affirmative or rejecting. All 
groups, however, demand 
greater religious rights for the 
public sphere (e.g., liberali-
zation of the headscarf ban)  
 
Rejecting 
 
Mode of 
Organization 
 
 
Presidency for Religious Affairs 
(Diyanet); Imam Hatip 
schools; state mosques and 
Koran classes; public media 
 
 
Private and state mosques and 
Koran classes; religious orders, 
brotherhoods and 
organizations (the largest are 
the Naqshbandi, the 
Süleymancı and the Nurcu) 
 
Private mosques; religious 
orders and organizations, 
including Milli Görüş; radical 
groups operating clandestinely 
(such as IBDA-C and Turkish 
Hizbullah)  
 
Adherents 
 
Approx. 40 million Turks and 
Kurds 
 
Approx. 10 million Turks and 
Kurds 
 
Approx. 7 million Turks and 
Kurds 
 
Legal  
Status 
 
Legal 
 
All brotherhoods and orders 
are officially banned. Since the 
expansion of the state’s edict of 
religious toleration under 
Turgut Özal, they have become 
integrated into public life 
through Koran schools, social 
institutions and holdings in the 
media and financial and 
industrial sectors 
 
All radical groups are banned. 
The more recent non-militant 
Islamic parties of Necmettin 
Erbakan were banned in 1998 
and 2001. His movement Milli 
Görüş is nevertheless 
integrated into legal public life 
through Koran schools, social 
institutions and holdings in the 
media and industrial sectors 
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